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INTRODUCTION:  DOES VOTING MATTER?
Does voting matter?  Of course you say, voting matters.And it matters more to members of ethnic and racial mi-
nority groups such as Asian Pacific Islander Americans
(APIAs),1 Latina/os,2 and African Americans who have until re-
1 Asian Pacific Islander American (APIA) is meant to encompass Asian and Pa-
cific Islander American groups as classified by the 2000 Census. See  Jessica S.
Barnes & Claudette E. Bennett, The Asian Population:  2000 , 2002 U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU 1 (“The term ‘Asian’ refers to people having origins in any of the original
peoples of the Far East, Southeast Asia, or the Indian subcontinent (for example,
Cambodia, China, India, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippine Islands,
Thailand, and Vietnam).  Asian groups are not limited to nationalities, but include
ethnic terms as well.”)  However, using a pan-ethnic umbrella term like APIA is
problematic in that it makes generalizations, and as April Chung has pointed out, “it
is impossible to make any generalization about the APA population without finding
a sub-group within the APA population that provides the exception. . . . APAs as a
whole are proportionately the largest noncitizen population in the United States, but
in 1990, only thirteen percent of Pacific Islanders were foreign-born.” See also  April
Chung, Noncitizen Voting Rights and Alternatives:  A Path Toward Greater Asian
Pacific American and Latino Political Participation , 4 UCLA ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J.
163, 163 n.3 (1996); Glenn D. Magpantay, Asian American Voting Rights and Repre-
sentation:  A Perspective From the Northeast , 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 739 (2001).
2 We use the term “Latina/os” instead of the census term “Hispanic” and it is used
in an pan-ethnic sense to include people from Mexico, Puerto Rico, Cuba, the Span-
ish-speaking countries of South and Central America and the Dominican Republic.
“Latina/o” is a term specifically utilized by LatCrit scholars to expose the interde-
pendency of categories such as race, ethnicity, nationality, and gender.
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cently been marginalized electorally and have often been the ob-
ject of political animus and overt racial discrimination.  While
some indicia of direct political disenfranchisement may have
been on the decline after the passage of the landmark Voting
Rights Act of 1965 (VRA),3 subtler forms of political disen-
franchisement of APIAs and Latina/os remain.
One goal of this Essay is to draw attention of LatCrit scholars
to the fundamental importance of securing political representa-
tion.  Political access is a condition precedent to seeking transfor-
mation of virtually every issue that has been articulated by
LatCrit scholars in the preceding six LatCrit Symposia.4  There
has, however, been a curious “blind spot” in the expanding Lat-
Crit canon regarding the promises and perils of electoral partici-
pation and representational politics.5  What does it mean that
electoral representation and issues like redistricting and reappor-
tionment have been largely absent from the LatCrit
conversation?
This curious omission is mirrored by the discourse of voting
rights, the so-called “Law of Democracy”6 in the legal academy,
which, unlike LatCrit, seems fixated on the Black/White para-
digm.  Where are the Latina/os?  Where are the APIAs in the
scholarship analyzing cases arising under the 14th Amendment
3 Voting Rights Act of 1965 as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973-74 et seq. (1994) (Pub.
L. No. 189-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965) as amended) [hereinafter VRA].
4 See  Symposium, LatCrit Theory:  Naming and Launching a New Discourse of
Critical Legal Scholarship , 2 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 1 (1997) (LatCrit I); Sympo-
sium, Difference, Solidarity and Law:  Building Latina/o Communities Through Lat-
Crit Theory , 19 UCLA CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 1 (1998) (LatCrit II); Symposium,
Comparative Latinas/os:  Identity, Law and Policy in LatCrit Theory , 53 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 575 (1999) (LatCrit III); Symposium, Rotating Centers, Expanding Frontiers:
LatCrit Theory and Marginal Intersections , 23 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 751 (2000) (Lat-
Crit IV); Symposium, Class in LatCrit:  Theory and Praxis in a World of Economic
Inequality , 78 DENV. U. L. REV. 467 (2001) (LatCrit V); Symposium, Latinas/os and
the Americas:  Centering North-South Frameworks in LatCrit Theory , 54 U. FLA. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2003); 54 RUTGERS L. REV. (forthcoming 2003). See also  Collo-
quium, International Law, Human Rights and LatCrit Theory , 28 U. MIAMI INTER-
AM. L. REV. 177 (1997); Colloquium, Spain, The Americas and Latino/as:  Interna-
tional and Comparative Law in Triangular Perspective , 9 U. MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L.
REV. 1 (2000-01); Joint Symposium, Culture, Language, Sexuality and Law:  LatCrit
Theory and the Construction of the Nation , 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. 787 (2000); 33 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 203 (2000); Joint Symposium, LatCrit Theory:  Latinas/os and
the Law , 85 CAL. L. REV. 1087 (1997); 10 LA RAZA L.J. 1 (1998).
5 Deborah Ramirez, Kevin R. Johnson, Sylvia P. Lazos Vargas, and Rachel F. Mo-
ran are notable exceptions.
6 SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF ET AL., THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE
OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS (2d ed. 2001).
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and the VRA of 1965?  The invisibility in legal scholarship of
both Latina/o and APIA struggles for political presence and rep-
resentation is both frustrating and telling.
The developing case law is revealing as well.  The Gingles v.
Thornburg  case,7 seminal in defining actionable voting rights
cases for minorities, was written in a black-white context where
racism manifested itself in extremely segregated residential and
voting patterns.  Demographics, political empowerment of mi-
norities, and the law have all changed in the ensuing years.  Cer-
tainly, in states such as California, where no one group is the
majority population, the hole left by civil rights case law is gap-
ing.  What legal protections can the VRA afford in this new con-
text of improving race relations but continuing institutional
racism? Cano v. Davis8 seems to suggest that Latina/os are so
well represented in local California politics that both a VRA sec-
tion 2 vote dilution claim and a 14th Amendment Equal Protec-
tion claim lack factual support.9 The recent elections of
California Assembly members George Nakano, Carol Liu,
Wilma Chan, and Judy Chu might similarly preclude the success
of such claims being made on behalf of APIA communities as
well.  Is it really that electorally rosy for Latina/os and APIAs in
California, such that they have no basis to raise voting rights
challenges based on legal arguments such as vote dilution and
claims of being the target of intentional discrimination by the po-
litical powers that be?  Or is it the case that the Courts have yet
to fashion legal interpretations that account for multi-ethnic, po-
litically-shifting populations?
This Essay seeks to spark scholarly discussion and activism re-
garding Latina/o and APIA electoral and political power within
(and without) LatCrit.  Scholars such as Professors Deborah Ra-
mirez,10 Rachel F. Moran,11 Kevin R. Johnson,12 and Sylvia R.
7 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
8 211 F. Supp. 2d 1208 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (per curiam).
9 Id.
10 Deborah Ramirez, Multicultural Empowerment:  It’s Not Just Black and White
Anymore , 47 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1995).
11 Rachel F. Moran, Demography and Distrust: The Latino Challenge to Civil
Rights and Immigration Policy in the 1990s and Beyond , 8 LA RAZA L.J. 1 (1995);
Rachel F. Moran, What If Latinos Really Mattered in the Public Policy Debate? , 85
CAL. L. REV. 1315 (1997).
12 Kevin R. Johnson, An Essay on Immigration Politics, Popular Democracy, and
California’s Proposition 187:  The Political Relevance and Legal Irrelevance of Race ,
70 WASH. L. REV. 629 (1995); Kevin R. Johnson, Civil Rights and Immigration:
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Lazos Vargas13 have begun touching on important issues and this
Essay builds on their work by explicitly introducing electoral rep-
resentation as an issue relevant to LatCrit Scholarship.
While the specific focus of this Essay is on the work of APIA
activists engaged in the redistricting process in California after
the 2000 census, the implications for Latina/os in states such as
California, New York, New Jersey, Texas, Florida, and Illinois
should be evident.
Before we begin, a few points need to be made.  First, broad-
based electoral policy-making may have a distinct political down-
side for ethnic and racial minorities.  Politicians and well-funded
bigots have used the proposition process to enact laws that un-
wind many of the Civil Rights gains of minority groups by ap-
pealing to racist fears and playing on social wedge issues.  Ballot
measures such as California’s Proposition 187 or 209, or Colo-
rado’s Ballot Measure 2 are prime examples of this.  As Derrick
Bell has pointed out, the so-called “direct democracy” of refer-
enda initiatives and ballot measures is a way for majority voters
to use the anonymity of the ballot box to strike directly at per-
ceived “gains” that members of minority communities may make
in the electoral process.14  Any strategy that does not account for
potential “white” backlash may need further analysis.
Second, internal solidarity and inclusive representation within
an ethnic or racial minority are important preconditions to coali-
tions among ethnic or racial minority groups.  As cooperation be-
Challenges for the Latino Community in the Twenty-First Century , 8 LA RAZA L.J.
42 (1995); Kevin R. Johnson, Immigration and Latino Identity , 19 UCLA CHICANO-
LATINO L. REV. 197 (1998); Kevin R. Johnson, Los Olvidados:  Images of the Immi-
grant, Political Power of Noncitizens, and Immigration Law and Enforcement , 1993
BYU L. REV. 1139; Kevin R. Johnson, Public Benefits and Immigration:  The Inter-
section of Immigration Status, Ethnicity, Gender, and Class , 42 UCLA L. REV. 1509
(1995); Kevin R. Johnson, Puerto Rico, Puerto Ricans, and LatCrit Theory:  Com-
monalities and Differences Between Latina/o Experiences , 6 MICH. J. RACE & L. 107
(2000); Kevin R. Johnson, Racial Hierarchy, Asian Americans and Latinos as “For-
eigners,” and Social Change:  Is Law the Way to Go? , 76 OR. L. REV. 347 (1997);
Kevin R. Johnson, Some Thoughts on the Future of Latino Legal Scholarship , 2
HARV. LATINO L. REV. 101 (1997).
13 Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, Deconstructing Homo[geneous] Americanus: The White
Ethnic Immigrant Narrative and Its Exclusionary Effect , 72 TUL. L. REV. 1493
(1998); Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, Democracy and Inclusion:  The Role of the Judge and
the Pluralist Polity , 58 MD. L. REV. 150 (1999); Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, Judicial
Review of Initiatives and Referendums in Which Majorities Vote on Minorities’ Dem-
ocratic Citizenship , 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 399 (1999).
14 Derrick A. Bell, Jr., The Referendum:  Democracy’s Barrier to Racial Equality ,
54 WASH. L. REV. 1, 6, 8, 9, 13-21, 24-26 (1978).
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tween the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational
Fund (MALDEF) and the array of APIA groups represented by
the Coalition of Asian Pacific Americans for Fair Redistricting
(CAPAFR) illustrate, activist groups must cultivate the avenues
of communication and spaces for debate.  Prior to being able to
engage in productive coalition-building, communities of color
must build an inclusive and representative process internally.15
Finally, it is important to remember we are in an era of con-
servative retrenchment and resistance.  Activists must work with
the sometimes demoralizing legal cases and precedents meted
out by the increasingly conservative federal courts.  Because we
are living in what has been called a “post-Civil Rights” era, crea-
tivity and imagination are essential to finding ways to make the
existing cases and legislation work for, rather than against, the
electoral empowerment of communities of color. Just as with the
U.S. Constitution, all American law is a living, evolving set of
norms reponding to societal changes as it is institutionally pushed
and pulled by activists, legal scholars, and our communities.
If APIAs, Latina/os and other communities of color do not rise
to the challenge of reshaping politics to be truly representative
and inclusive at all levels of state and local government, members
of those communities should be prepared to be excluded from
decisions affecting the provision of the most essential of govern-
ment services: decent housing, education and health care.
To what extent are state legislatures, local governments and
other institutions designed to exclude undocumented immigrants
from access to vital resources such as quality K-12 education?
Are local zoning ordinances designed to concentrate on recent
immigrants who are racial minorities in property-tax poor areas?
Are state and local ordinances designed to exclude non-English
speaking members from participating in or accessing health care,
education and other essential services?  If so, only representa-
tives dedicated to change the effects of those ordinances will be
able to initiate fundamental transformation and change in those
patterns.  An important answer to all these questions lies in who
is in control of the funding and drawing of the relevant ordi-
nances and regulations.  It matters who your local school board
members are; who your city council members are; who your
county supervisors and commissioners are; and who your state
15 ERIC K. YAMAMOTO, INTERRACIAL JUSTICE: CONFLICT AND RECONCILI-ATION
IN POST CIVIL RIGHTS AMERICA (1999).
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assembly and state senators are.  The authors believe that mean-
ingful political participation beginning (but not ending) with fair
representation is an absolutely necessary and crucial precondi-
tion to achieving and implementing the substantive social justice
and anti-subordination agenda of LatCrit.
Does voting matter?  If one accepts that our American democ-
racy depends on full electoral representation and participation at
the voting booth and in the halls of power to be effective, the
answer must be “yes.”
With that being said, this Essay first gives some background on
redistricting, then discusses earlier legislative iterations of the
census with regard to Latina/os and APIA communities.  The Es-
say then moves to a detailed discussion of CAPAFR’s involve-
ment with the post-2000 California redistricting process and
assess that involvement.  Finally, this Essay draws some conclu-
sions as to APIA involvement with redistricting and its implica-
tions for Latina/o and APIA political representation in the near
future.
I
OVERVIEW OF REDISTRICTING
Redistricting is an esoteric, under-appreciated process with
tremendous consequences that bear heavily on all groups.  In the
past, some minority groups, particularly APIAs and Latina/os,
have not paid enough attention to this process and experienced
the after effects much too late to seek redress.  The effects of lack
of political representation in APIA and Latina/o communities
are evident in the social, cultural, and economic marginalization
of group members, both historically and presently.
This Essay’s main focus is to examine the emergence of an
APIA political presence from the early 1990s to post-2000.  A
subsidiary focus is to examine parallel struggles within the La-
tina/o community for a political presence in groundbreaking
cases such as Garza v. County of Los Angeles16 that the APIA
community has sought to build upon.
Over the past decade in different but related ways, Californian
Latina/os and APIAs have prioritized redistricting into their re-
spective political agendas.  For Latina/os in California, the partic-
ipation in the redistricting process began as much as three
16 918 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1990).
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decades ago, and has born fruit that was undeniably evident in
the 2001 statewide redistricting process.  For APIAs, the sphere
of influence has gone from nonexistent to the point where a Cali-
fornia legislator was quoted as saying, “compared to the other
special interest groups working on reapportionment, the Asians
have their act together.”17  This Essay does not  accept uncriti-
cally this positing of APIAs as a ‘voting rights model minority,’
but seeks to describe the conscious strategy advanced by APIA
groups in the post-2000 census redistricting process, and present
redistricted maps that would not only represent the true diversity
of California’s population, but also a vision of electoral participa-
tion that refused to perpetuate racial wedge politics.
The following section outlines basic redistricting principles in-
cluding the process itself and the bearing it has had on the APIA
community in the years that lacked strong APIA participation.
A. The Census
The United States takes a census every ten years.  The Census
Bureau attempts to be as inclusive of all people in the United
States as possible, attempting to count not only citizens but also
non-citizens with temporary or permanent residency status, refu-
gees, the homeless, and undocumented residents.18  One of the
main purposes of the decennial Census is to provide an updated
population count for purposes of determining the fair allocation
of House of Representative seats to states.  The U.S. Constitu-
tion stipulates that the lower house of Congress have a fixed
number of seats, whose allocation generally follows the principle
of one-person, one-vote.19  The 435 seats in the House of Repre-
sentatives are divided among the fifty states based on state popu-
lation.  The larger the state population, the more congressional
representatives they receive.20  Each decennial census reveals
17 Maeley Tom, APIAs . . . Making Gains in the Highest Stake Political Game—
Redistricting  5 (2001) (quoting an anonymous legislator in the California State As-
sembly) (on file with author).
18 California State Assembly Committee on Elections, Reapportionment, and
Constitutional Amendments, Redistricting Process Background Information , availa-
ble at  http://www.assembly.ca.gov/acs/committee/c7/publications/2001_backgrnd.pdf
(last visited July 1, 2002) [hereinafter Redistricting Process Background
Information].
19 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (holding that the one person, one vote prin-
ciple derives from U.S. Const. Art. I, § 2, Cl. 3).
20 The actual process of reapportioning seats in the U.S. House of Representatives
follows a complex formula whose explanation is beyond the scope of this report.
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which states have gained or lost population.  That relative gain or
loss translates directly into a gain or loss of congressional seats.
The process of reallocating these seats is known as
reapportionment.21
In 1964, the U.S. Supreme Court declared the same principle
of population equality be applied not only to congressional but
also to state legislative districts.22  Reallocation of districts at the
congressional level, coupled with the population changes in ex-
isting districts mandates the redrawing of district boundaries at
the congressional, state, city, and local levels in order to achieve
districts with the same, or close to the same, number of people.
This process of redrawing district lines to ensure each district has
equal population is called redistricting.23
In the 2001 reapportionment process of the 435 congressional
seats, California received an additional congressional seat for a
total of fifty-three to reflect its relative increase in population
over the past decade.  The California legislature and the gover-
nor had to pass a new fifty-three-seat congressional district plan
in which each congressional district had exactly 639,088 people,
or close to that number in it.24  California also needed to redis-
The United States has used five different formulas in its history, with the current
formula known as the “method of equal proportions.” The Supreme Court upheld
this formula, which has been in place since 1940, in the 1992 unanimous ruling in
United States Dep’t of Commerce v. Montana , 503 U.S. 442 (1992).  A detailed re-
port on this formula can be found at http://www.census.gov/srd/papers/pdf/rr92-6.
pdf.  Simple proportion allocations do not work for two reasons.  For one, no frac-
tional seats exist in Congress, necessitating a rounding system for these somewhat
ambiguous seats.  More importantly, the guarantee that each state will have at least
one seat in the House of Representatives is always upheld even if its share of the
nation’s population is ‘worth’ less than half a seat.  Steven K. Doig, Reapportion-
ment, Reporting Census 2000 A Guide for Journalists , available at  http://cronkite.pp.
asu.edu/census/apportion.htm (last modified July 25, 2000).
21 MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND ET AL., THE IM-
PACT OF REDISTRICTING IN YOUR COMMUNITY:  A GUIDE TO REDISTRICTING 8
[hereinafter IMPACT OF REDISTRICTING]. See also ROBERT B. MCKAY, REAPPOR-
TIONMENT:  THE LAW AND POLITICS OF EQUAL REPRESENTATION 6 (1965) (“Appor-
tionment has ordinarily been described as the allocation of legislative seats by a
legislative body to a subordinate unit of government, and districting as the process
of drawing the final lines by which each legislative district is bounded.”).
22 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); see also TANIA AZORES & PAUL ONG,
REAPPORTIONMENT AND REDISTRICTING IN A NUTSHELL (1991).  The California
Constitution requires state legislative redistricting after the U.S. Census. See  Cal.
Const., art. XXI, § 1; see also  Wilson v. Eu, 823 P.2d 545 (Cal. 1992) (inferring that
the one person, one vote applicability to States derives from the Equal Protection
Clause of the 14th Amendment).
23 IMPACT OF REDISTRICTING, supra  note 21, at 8.
24 John Ellis, Valley Residents Want Politics Out of Redistricting , FRESNO BEE,
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trict its eighty State Senate districts to achieve an ideal popula-
tion of 846,791 each and its forty Assembly districts to approach
423,396 people in each.25  All three levels of government had to
be redistricted in time for the 2002 election.26  In order to facili-
tate redistricting decision-making, the Census Bureau provides
each state with more detailed census data, specifically, ethnicity
and voting age population, broken down by census tract and cen-
sus block.27
For example, the 2000 Census released the counts for Califor-
nia.  California’s total population count was 33,871,648.28  The
Latina/o population was counted at 10,966,566 (32.4%); the
APIA population was counted at 3,752,596 (11.1%);29 and the
African American population was counted at 2,263,882 (6.7%).30
Inevitably, some persons are not counted, resulting in a census
undercount.  Although the exact size of the undercount has been
disputed, it is generally agreed that more of this undercount lies
in communities with a high proportion of poor, non-English
speakers, racial and ethnic minorities, many of whom are recent
immigrants.31  Many of these recent immigrants are from Asian
May 12, 2001, at B1. See also Redistricting Information for 2001 , available at  http://
republican.assembly.ca.gov/Issues/Districting/index.htm.
25 See California State Senate Districts 2002 , available at  http://www.ncec.org/re-
districting/Cass02stat.pdf (Senate ideal population); California State House Districts ,
available at  http://www.ncec.org/redistricting/Cash02stat.pdf (Assembly ideal popu-
lation); see generally Redistricting Information for 2001 , supra  note 24.
26 Redistricing Process Background Information , supra  note 18.
27 This is known as the Public Law (PL) 94-171 data and is the official database
used for redistricting.  The Census Bureau divides each state into “census tracts.” In
California, there are 7,049 census tracts, which are further broken down into “census
blocks.” California has 533,163 such blocks.  For the most part, these tracts and
blocks do not violate city or county boundaries. See Redistricting Process Back-
ground Information , supra  note 18.
28 U.S. Census 2000 Summary File (SF1) 100-Percent Data, DP1 Profile of Gen-
eral Demographic Characteristics:  2000 Geographic Area:  California, at  http://fact
finder.census.gov/bf/_lang=en_vt_name=DEC_2000_SF1_U_DP1_geo_id=04000US
06.html.
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 Glenn D. Magpantay, Asian American Voting Rights and Representation:  A
Perspective from the Northeast , 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 739 (2001); see also  Dep’t of
Commerce v. U.S. House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316 (1999) (holding that the
Census Act proposed the purposed use of statistical sampling in calculating the pop-
ulation for purposes of apportionment); GLENN D. MAGPANTAY & PHILIP M. LIU,
ASIAN AMERICAN LEGAL DEFENSE & EDUCATION FUND, COUNTING ASIAN AMERI-
CANS: AN EVALUATION OF CENSUS 2000 PROGRAMS AND POLICIES (2001); MARK
GIRSH & KEN STRASMA, NAT’L COMM. FOR AN EFFECTIVE CONG., 1990 CENSUS
UNDERCOUNT BY CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT (Sept. 20, 1998), available at  http://
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and Latin American countries.  While there are many demo-
graphic distinctions, there are many striking parallels as well.32
Since states like California, New York, and Florida have more
recent immigrants and minorities than most, they are more likely
to have populations that are undercounted.33
Adjustment of census reports to reflect the undercount re-
sulted in a lawsuit that reached the U.S. Supreme Court.  In
Dep’t of Commerce v. U.S. House of Representatives ,34 the Court
held that the census data could not be statistically adjusted for
purposes of reapportionment, but could be adjusted for purposes
of redistricting and distribution of funds under federal
formulas.35
B. Voting Rights Law
In voting rights law, there are several principles that fall into
four categories that this Article will address in order:  (1) the
“one person, one vote” standard; (2) the Voting Rights Act of
1965 and subsequent amendments; (3) the 2000 census:  multiple
www.ncec.org/under.pdf; U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, BRIEFING ON THE CIVIL
RIGHTS IMPLICATIONS OF THE RECENT SUPREME COURT DECISION ON SAMPLING
AND THE CENSUS BEFORE THE U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS (Feb. 12, 1999),
available at  http://www.connectlive.com/events/civilrightscommission/sampling0212
99.html (Statement by Karen K. Narasaki, Exec. Dir., Nat’l Asian Pac. Am. Legal
Consortium) [hereinafter U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS]; Steven A. Holmes, New
York Hardest Hit by Census Flaws , N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1998, at B6; Glenn D.
Magpantay, Flawed Census Figures , N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2001, at A12.
32 Chung, supra  note 1, at 174-75.
33 Id. ; see also  Holmes, supra  note 31.
34 525 U.S. 316 (1999); see also  Pamela S. Karlan, The Fire Next Time:  Reappor-
tionment After the 2000 Census , 50 STAN. L. REV. 731 (1998); Maki Becker, Asians
Watching Census, Legal Defense Fund Wary of Undercount , N.Y. DAILY NEWS, July
6, 2000, at 1; Mae M. Cheng, Down for the Count, Low Response to Census in
Queens’ Minority Communities , NEWSDAY, Apr. 7, 2000, at A7; Steven A. Holmes,
The Big Census Issue:  Using Sampling in Redistricting , N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2000,
§ 1, at 24; Steven A. Holmes, The Politics of Race and the Census , N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
19, 2000, at A3; Claire Hsiang, Editorial, Burned at the Ballot Box , N.Y. TIMES, May
11, 1996, at 19; Rose Kim, Voting Block; Asian-Americans Say Foul-Ups Kept Them
From Polls , NEWSDAY, May 10, 1996, at A3; Glenn D. Magpantay, Flawed Census
Figures , supra  note 31; David Stout, Census Takers Uneasy as Mail Response Lags ,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 2000, at A16; BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP’T OF COM-
MERCE, REPORT TO CONGRESS—THE PLAN FOR CENSUS 2000 (1997), available at
http://www.uscensus2000.com/main/plans/plan2000.pdf; U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL
RIGHTS, supra  note 31.
35 The adjustment of the Census data to include the undercounted is politically
controversial because the adjustment would tend to increase populations in Demo-
cratic states and areas. U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra  note 31.
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race categories; and (4) “traditional redistricting principles.”36
1. One person, one vote
Redistricting adheres to a one-person, one-vote standard for
both federal and state districts.37  This principle, perhaps the
most fundamental requirement in this process, calls for popula-
tion equality among districts.38  Congressional districts must fol-
low a relatively strict standard allowing for only minimal
variances in population between districts, whereas state and local
election districts follow a considerably looser standard.39
While there is no minimum acceptable level of deviation for
congressional plans, the deviation should be nearly equal, or as
equal “as is practicable.”40  The leading case on population
equality of congressional districts is Karcher v. Daggett41 that
holds that deviations must be justified by a state’s need to
achieve a legitimate redistricting goal.42
36 See , e.g. , Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996); Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996);
Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
37 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
38 The concept of equal representation states that each voting citizen has an equal
opportunity to elect the candidate of his or her choice.  For example, if a situation
arises where there are 100 people in one district and ten people in another, then
those in the second district have a vote that weighs ten times more than those in the
first district.  To alleviate this problem, an equal population requirement has been
applied to redistricting to ensure that each citizen’s vote carries a relatively equal
weight.  Hence, the concept of one person, one vote arose. See  Reynolds, 377 U.S.
at 557-58.
39 Two standards are used to measure population equality.  “Overall population
deviation” or “total population deviation” refers to the most widely used measure—
the difference between populations of the most heavily and least heavily populated
districts.  This is expressed as a percentage of the ideal, or average, population of a
district.  For example, a state with perfect population equality for its 2000 residents
and five districts would have districts with exactly 400 people in each.  If the state’s
five districts had populations of 380, 390, 400, 400, and 410 respectively, it would
have deviations of 0, 0, 10, 10, and 20.  Thus, the overall population deviation would
be 40, which can also be expressed as ten percent of the ideal population of 400.  The
second, less used measure for population equality is “average population deviation,”
the average of each district’s deviation from the ideal.  To use the above example, a
state with district populations of 380, 390, 400, 400, and 410 and therefore deviations
of 0, 0, 10, 10, and 20 would have an average population deviation of 8.  This can also
be expressed as two percent of the ideal population of 400.  The courts most often
use total population deviation as the benchmark to determine whether or not a
deviation is too high to be constitutionally acceptable.  J. Gerald Hebert et al., The
Realists’ Guide to Redistricting:  Avoiding the Legal Pitfalls , 2000 A.B.A. SEC. AD-
MIN L. & REG. PRAC. 1-2.
40 Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1964).
41 462 U.S. 725 (1983).
42 See id.  This ruling required two questions to be answered to determine if a
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Currently, the largest population deviation accepted by the
courts occurs in the Texas Congressional plan (0.82%).  It should
be noted, however, that this deviation resulted from a court-
drawn plan that came on the heels of the Bush v. Vera43 Supreme
Court decision.44  Thus, the 2000 round of redistricting provided
a remedy for the unconstitutional racial gerrymandering in the
Houston and Dallas areas.45
As compared to congressional reapportionment, federal law is
not as strict on state legislative redistricting.  While state districts
must conform to the “one person, one vote” standard, its applica-
tion is more flexible.  A total population deviation of up to ten
congressional plan complies with art. I, § 2 of the U.S. CONST., which has been inter-
preted to mean that only minimal deviations are acceptable in congressional district-
ing plans.  The first question asks if population differences among districts have been
reduced or eliminated altogether by a good-faith effort to draw districts of equal
population.  The second question asks whether or not a state that did not make a
good-faith effort to achieve equality can prove that each significant variance among
districts was necessary to achieve some legitimate goal.  States making good-faith
efforts draw districts with virtually no deviations.  States can also enact redistricting
plans under the second of Karcher ’s two “steps,” where larger total population devi-
ations must be justified by some legitimate goal.  This ultimately raises the question
of legitimacy, and which goals qualify as such.  As long as a state consistently applies
a legislative policy without discrimination, the following goals may  justify some
variance:
• Compactness
• Respecting municipal boundaries
• Respecting county boundaries if counties are small enough to represent com-
munities of interest
• Respecting precinct boundaries
• Preserving the cores of prior districts, and
• Avoiding contests between incumbents.
A successful defense against a population inequality charge includes relating each
overpopulated or underpopulated district to one of the aforementioned legitimate
state policies.  The courts can weigh several different factors in examining the case,
including size of deviation, importance of the state’s interests, consistency with
which the plan reflects those interests overall, and the possibility that alternative
plans can protect those interests while still retaining population equality.  If the state
fails to provide legitimate justification and specifically relate that justification to
each district in question, the courts will likely find the plan unconstitutional.  Such
was the case in Karcher , where a congressional plan with a total deviation of only
0.6984% was not justified by a consistently applied legislative policy.  Hebert et al.,
supra  note 39, at 2-4.
43 517 U.S. 952 (1996).
44 The actual ruling that prompted the court-drawn plan came from Vera v. Bush ,
933 F. Supp. 1341, 1348 n.9 (S.D. Tex. 1996) (three-judge court). Bush v. Vera  struck
down three districts (the 30th District in Dallas with a black majority, the 18th Dis-
trict in Houston with a black majority, and the 29th District in Houston with a His-
panic majority) as unconstitutional racial gerrymanders.  517 U.S. 952 (1996).
45 Hebert et al., supra  note 39, at 5.
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percent is considered acceptable without any justification.46  De-
viations below ten percent may still be challenged if shown to be
unconstitutional, or the product of some arbitrary or irrational
state policy.47
California has a history of holding itself to a higher standard
than other states.  An example of this occurred in 1973.  The Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court in Legislature v. Reinecke48 appointed
special masters to develop a redistricting plan for the California
legislature and a reapportionment plan for congressional seats af-
ter the Legislature’s plans failed to win the governor’s approval.
The courts approved specific criteria for the redistricting that in-
cluded population equality as nearly equal as possible in congres-
sional districts and ‘within one percent of the ideal’ in legislative
districts.49  However the motivation behind this stricter applica-
tion of the population equality standard stems from the large size
of California districts.50  A one or two percent variance in popu-
lation affects a much larger group of persons in California than in
other states.51
Justifications above ten percent generally follow the same
guidelines for permissibility in the courts as with congressional
districts.  However, these justifications, like the districts them-
selves, are given more leeway in the state legislative redistricting
process than in congressional reapportionment contexts.52
46 As in the earlier example of five districts with ideally 400 people each, any plan
with a total population deviation of forty persons or less (10% of 400) presumably is
acceptable to the courts.  To clarify, the deviations of all five districts are tallied, and
that total must be less than forty (or ten percent of the ideal). Id.  at 7.
47 Id.
48 516 P.2d 6, 9 (1973).
49 Redistricting Process Background Information , supra  note 18.
50 Reinecke , 516 P.2d at 6.
51 To illustrate:  in three other cases where reasonable equality of state legislative
districts was called into question—White v. Regester , 412 U.S. 755, 756-62 (1973);
Gaffney v. Cummings , 412 U.S. 735, 740-52 (1973); Mahan v. Howell , 93 U.S. 979
(1973)—the ideal size of legislative districts ranged from 46,485 to 74,645.  The ideal
California assembly district has a population of 249,661—nearly three times the size
of the largest ideal in the other three districts. Reinecke , 516 P.2d at 15-16.  This
affirms the fact that a one or two percent deviation means a lot more to a California
district than to those in other states.
52 A prime example involves preservation of political subdivisions, a noteworthy
goal for a state or legislative districting plan.  In Brown v. Thompson , 462 U.S. 835
(1983), the Supreme Court upheld Wyoming’s state legislative plan despite an aver-
age deviation of 16% and a total deviation of 89%.  Wyoming’s state constitution
mandates that every county be separately represented in the legislature, prompting
the Court to uphold the plan based on longstanding and consistent application of
that legitimate state policy.  However, this rationale did not hold up in the redistrict-
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2. Voting Rights Act (VRA) of 1965, as Amended
This section provides an overview of the VRA,53 focusing spe-
cifically on sections 2 and 5.  In particular, section 203, which was
amended in 1992, will be assessed to determine its effects on vot-
ing rights and the redistricting process.
The VRA placed heavy emphasis on the Fifteenth Amend-
ment, that prohibited any techniques that “[deny] or [abridge] . . .
the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of
race or color.”54  The VRA also imposed additional requirements
and procedures on state redistricting.  Noncompliance with VRA
requirements often results in protracted litigation, which has
been the focus of an important line of Supreme Court decisions
ing plan following the 1990 Census.  In Gorin v. Karpan , 775 F. Supp. 1430 (D. Wyo.
1991) (three-judge panel), the district court struck down a plan with total deviations
of 83% and 58% in the House and Senate plans, respectively.  The court ruled that
the state constitutional requirement of county preservation could not be elevated
“to such an extreme extent over the ‘one person, one vote’ requirement of the Fed-
eral Constitution.” The Wyoming case serves as a reminder, however, that state con-
stitutions must be consulted to determine the constitutionality of districting plans.
Hebert et al., supra  note 39, at 8.
53 VRA, supra  note 3.  Section 2 of the VRA forbids any voting qualification or
prerequisite to voting that denies or abridges the right of any citizen of the United
States to vote on account of race or color.  Section Five forbids certain state and
local governments from implementing any new voting procedures (such as newly
drawn districts) without first allowing the U.S. Attorney General an opportunity to
object so as to ensure that any proposed changes will not lead to a retrogression in
the position of racial minorities exercising their electoral franchise.
The 1965 VRA was amended in 1975 to expand protection to language minorities.
Specifically, section 203 allows a community to qualify for bilingual voting assistance
if they meet the following requirements:
a.  (1) More than five percent of the voting-age citizens in a jurisdiction belong to
a single language minority community and have limited English abilities, or (2)
More than 10,000 voting-age citizens in a jurisdiction belong to a single language
community and have limited English abilities (this provision was added in the 1992
Amendments to the VRA), and
b.  The illiteracy rate of the citizens in the language minority is higher than the
national illiteracy rate.
The 1982 Amendments to the VRA were in response to the Supreme Court case,
City of Mobile v. Bolden , 446 U.S. 55 (1980), in which the Court held that § 2 of the
VRA did not authorize a remedy in vote dilution cases absent proof that the dis-
criminatory dilution was intentional. See also  Rep. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary
that “concluded that [the Bolden] . . . intent test places an unacceptably difficult
burden on plaintiffs [in § 2 cases, and] . . . diverts the judicial [inquiry] from the
crucial inquiry whether minorities have equal access to the electoral process to a
historical question of individual motives.” See  S. Rep. No. 97-417, at 16 (1982), re-
printed in  1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 193.
54 42 U.S.C. § 173(a). See also FLORENCE ADAMS, LATINOS AND LOCAL REPRE-
SENTATION 5 (2000); DERRICK A. BELL, JR., RACE, RACISM & AMERICAN LAW 571-
651 (4th ed. 2000); Ramirez, supra  note 10.
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over the past decade.55  Of particular concern to redistricting are
sections 2 and 5, that seek to prevent minority vote dilution and
retrogression, respectively.56
Section 2  of the VRA applies to all jurisdictions.  It prohibits
states from imposing any standard that deprives minorities of an
equal opportunity to participate in the political process (i.e. to
elect candidates of their choice).57  In the redistricting context,
minority vote dilution occurs when states minimize minority
group influence in the political process by “packing” or “crack-
ing” minority group populations.58  “Packing” is the overconcen-
tration of minority group populations into one or two districts for
the purpose of minimizing their sphere of legislative influence.
“Cracking” occurs when minorities are dispersed among differ-
ent districts so no one district has enough minorities to influence
the political process.59
In the decades following the initial passage of the VRA, due to
a 1982 Congressional amendment to the VRA, the Supreme
Court shifted its stance from the requirement of discriminatory
intent to prove a section 2 violation that it took in 1980,60 to-
55 See  Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996); Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996);
United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737 (1995); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995);
Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
56 Heather K. Gerken, Understanding the Right to an Undiluted Vote , 114 HARV.
L. REV. 1663 (2001); see also  Angelo Ancheta & Kathryn Imahara, Multi-Ethnic
Voting Rights:  Redefining Vote Dilution in Communities of Color , 27 U.S.F. L. REV.
815 (1993); Su Sun Bai, Affirmative Pursuit of Political Equality for Asian Pacific
Americans:  Redefining the Voting Rights Act , 139 U. PA. L. REV. 731 (1991);
Magpantay, supra  note 1; Judith Reed, Of Boroughs, Boundaries and Bullwinkles:
The Limitations of Single Member Districts in a Multiracial Context , 19 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 759 (1992).
57 Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986); BRUCE E. CAIN, THE REAPPORTION-
MENT PUZZLE (1984); Richard M. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms,
“Bizzare Districts” and Voting Rights:  Evaluating Election District Appearances after
Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 483 (1993).
58 IMPACT OF REDISTRICTING, supra  note 21, at 18. KATHLEEN L. BARBER, A
RIGHT TO REPRESENTATION: PROPORTIONAL ELECTION SYSTEMS FOR THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 66 (2000).
59 BARBER, supra  note 58, at 66 (“When single-member districts are used, repre-
sentation in the city or state as a whole depends on the way the population is geo-
graphically distributed and on how the district or ward lines are drawn. . . .
Traditional techniques of gerrymandering have often determined the composition of
a council or a state legislative house, either by bunching (often called “packing”)
partisan, ethnic, or racial groups into a district so that votes contributing to unneces-
sarily large majorities are wasted; or by spreading minority populations thinly across
several districts so that they do not constitute a majority in any district
(“cracking”)).
60 City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
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wards a standard requiring only the proof of discriminatory ef-
fect,61 not intent.62  The current test for deciding minority vote
dilution comes from the results of Thornburg v. Gingles .63  The
Supreme Court set forth three factors, known as the Gingles  test,
that a minority group must prove in order to establish a section 2
violation:
• The minority group is sufficiently large and geographically
concentrated to make up a majority in an single-member
district64
• The group is politically cohesive, or it usually votes for the
same candidates,65 and
• In the absence of special circumstances, the white majority
votes together to defeat the minority’s preferred
candidate.66
If the minority group challenging redistricting decisions suc-
61 See Gingles , 478 U.S. at 35 (“Congress substantially revised § 2 to make clear
that a violation could be proved by showing discriminatory effect alone. . . .”).
62 But see  Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874 (1994) (holding that a section 2 claim could
not be maintained against an at-large method of choosing County Commissioners in
the absence of intentional discrimination).
63 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
64 See  Campos v. City of Houston, 113 F.3d 544, 548 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that
citizen voting age population data is an appropriate measure to use in determing if
an effective majority-minority district can be created); Negron v. City of Miami
Beach, 113 F.3d 1563, 1569 (11th Cir. 1997); African-Am. Voting Rights Legal Def.
Fund v. Villa, 54 F.3d 1345, 1348 (8th Cir. 1995) (concluding that 60% of the voting
age population or 65% of the total population is reasonably sufficient to provide an
effective majority); Romero v. City of Pomona, 883 F.2d 1418, 1426 (9th Cir. 1988).
65 A recent example of racial cohesion would be the 97% of Latina/os who voted
for Los Angeles mayoral candidate Antonio Villaraigosa. See  Cano v. Davis, 211 F.
Supp. 2d 1208 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (per curiam) (“In 1990 there were only seven Latinos
in the state legislature and none in statewide office.  But as 1990 close[d], there
[were] six in the senate alone, twenty-three total in the legislature.  The State As-
sembly ha[d] seen it’s first and second Latino speakers, and a Latino—Cruz Busta-
mente—was elected lieutenant governor for the first time [in the twentieth
century.”].  The plaintiffs in Garza  made a successful showing that there was racially
polarized voting in Los Angeles County. See  Garza v. County of Los Angeles, 918
F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1990).
66 Jenkins v. Red Clay Consol. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Ed., 4 F.3d 1103, 1128 (3d Cir.
1993) (finding that white v. white elections are less probative on the third Gingles
prong); League of United Latin Am. Citizens, Council No. 4344 v. Clements, 999
F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1993) (white v. white elections less probative); Westwego Citizens
for Better Gov’t v. Westwego, 872 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1989) (elections with black
and white candidates are most probative to show racial polarization); Citizens for a
Better Gretna v. Gretna, 834 F.2d 496, 502 (5th Cir. 1987) (allowing use of exoge-
nous elections to make a showing for the third prong of the Gingles  test); Johnson v.
Hamrick, 155 F. Supp. 2d 1355, 1375 (N.D. Ga. 2001) (allowing both exogenous and
endogenous elections as evidence).
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cessfully establishes these three circumstances, the Supreme
Court in Johnson v. DeGrandy67 held that the next question is
whether, “under the ‘totality of circumstances,’ the minority
group had less opportunity than other members of the electorate
to participate in the electoral process and to elect representatives
of their choice.”68
Section 5 of the VRA applies only to those jurisdictions where
the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) has found a history of dis-
crimination in voting towards minority groups.  These “covered”
jurisdictions (usually a county) must submit any law that could
affect voting to the DOJ for review.69  Required submissions in-
clude redistricting plans, changes in location of polling places,
67 512 U.S. 997, 1010 (1994) (while the three Gingles  factors are necessary to
prove a VRA § 2 violation, they are not all that is required, if the Gingles showing is
successfully made, then a court must then ask the “totality of the circumstances” to
see if minority voter’s power is actually diluted).  The Court wrote that
“[F]actfinders cannot rest uncritically on assumptions about the force of the Gingles
factors in pointing to dilution.” Id . at 1013.  See also Zimmer v. McKeithan , 485 F.2d
1297 (1973), which the DeGrandy Court cited approvingly as laying out “totality of
circumstances” factors listed in the S. Jud. Comm. Rep. on the 1982 Amendments to
VRA § 2, S. Rep. No. 97-417, at 28-29 (1982), reprinted in  1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177,
206-07.  These additional Zimmer  factors are:
(1) the extent of any history of official discrimination in the state or politi-
cal subdivision that touched the right of the members of the minority group
to register, to vote, or otherwise participate in the [political] process;
(2) the extent to which voting in the elections of the state or political sub-
division is racially polarized;
(3) the extent to which the state or political subdivision has used unusually
large election districts, majority voting requirements, anti-single shot provi-
sions, or other voting practices or procedures that may enhance the oppor-
tunity for discrimination against the minority group;
(4) if there is a candidate slating process, whether the members of the mi-
nority group have been denied access to that process;
(5) the extent to which members of the minority group in the state or polit-
ical subdivision bear the effects of discrimination in such areas as educa-
tion, employment and health, which hinder their ability to participate
effectively in the political process;
(6) whether political campaigns have been characterized by overt or subtle
racial appeals;
(7) the extent to which members of the minority group have been elected
to public office in the jurisdiction;
Additional factors that have had probative value are:  “whether there is a significant
lack of responsiveness on the part of elected officials to the particularized needs of
the members of the minority;” and “whether the policy underlying the state or polit-
ical subdivision’s use of such voting qualifications, prerequisite to voting, or stan-
dard, practice or procedure is tenuous.” S. Rep. No. 97-417, at 28-29 (1982),
reprinted in  1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 206-07.
68 IMPACT OF REDISTRICTING, supra  note 21, at 17.
69 In California, section 5 applies to Kings, Merced, Monterey, and Yuba counties.
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changes affecting voter registration, and changes affecting eligi-
bility or qualifications for voting and running for office.70  Sec-
tion 5 requires “preclearance” for redistricting plans affecting
covered jurisdictions, in essence certifying that the voting law
changes show no discriminatory, or retrogressive, effect.71
Section 203  of the VRA requires certain jurisdictions to pro-
vide bilingual oral and written assistance in the languages of lim-
ited-English proficient communities.72  A recurrent problem has
been English-speaking and reading ability and the availability of
multilingual voting materials and multilingual pollworkers to an-
swer questions.  Many recently naturalized citizens, in particular
Latinas/os and Asians, lack the ability to read English, let alone
fully comprehend voting materials.73  This often discourages
these citizens from exercising their fundamental right to vote.  In
1975, Congress enacted VRA section 203, “recognizing the link
between language barriers and low voter turnout.”74  Counties or
cities were required to provide assistance if the voter eligible
population of a single language minority was greater than five
percent of the voting-age citizen population, and the illiteracy
rate of the citizens in the language minority group was higher
than the national illiteracy rate.75
Many jurisdictions with significant Latina/o populations had to
comply with section 203.  However, APIA communities found
the five percent threshold to be too high.  Thus, outside of Ha-
waii, in 1990 no APIA language community could qualify for sec-
70 IMPACT OF REDISTRICTING, supra  note 21, at 32.
71 Preclearance can be obtained either by submission of a plan to the DOJ or by
declaratory judgment in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia that the
changes do not violate section 5.  For many reasons, including expense and time, it is
much easier to seek preclearance through the DOJ process than through the court
system. IMPACT OF REDISTRICTING, supra  note 21, at 33.
72 Although not directly tied to the redistricting process, section 203 of the Voting
Rights Act plays an important role in voting rights for minority group populations.
Since the redistricting process requires community involvement, which is fostered by
increased voter education and turnout, any measure that strengthens the voting
power of a minority group ultimately influences redistricting.
73 Chung, supra  note 1, at 163 (“Most citizens with limited proficiency are only
able to vote when voting materials are in their native language.”).  For an example
of bungled bilingual ballots in New York City Elections in 2000, see Editorial, Bun-
gled Ballots in Chinatown , N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2001, at A12; see generally TIMOTHY
P. FONG, THE CONTEMPORARY ASIAN AMERICAN EXPERIENCE:  BEHIND THE
MODEL MINORITY 269-70 (1998).
74 IMPACT OF REDISTRICTING, supra  note 21, at 46.
75 Id.  at 47.
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tion 203’s protections.76
However, due to extensive advocacy on the part of civil rights
groups in 1992, Congress amended and reauthorized section 203.
The amendments kept the old five percent threshold, but added a
numerical benchmark that could be attained, along with the illit-
eracy requirement.77  This numerical benchmark required that
there be more than 10,000 voting-age citizens in a jurisdiction
who belong to a single language community with limited English
proficiency.  As a result, APIAs, American Indians, Alaska Na-
tives, and additional Latina/o voters were able to receive the
benefits of section 203.78  Ensuring compliance has been a slow
and sometimes difficult process, but overall these communities
are benefiting from the expanded scope of this section in the
VRA.79
3. The 2000 Census:  Multiple Race Categories
Historically the collection of census data about APIAs has
been intermittent and spotty:
The first United States decennial census in 1790 collected data
on race, but no distinction was made for people of Asian de-
scent.  Data have been collected on the Chinese population
since the 1860 census and on the Japanese population since the
1870 census.  The racial classification was expanded in the
76 Nat’l Asian Pac. Legal Consortium, Bilingual Voting Assistance:  How To Use
the Voting Rights Act , available at  http://www.napalc.org.
77 IMPACT OF REDISTRICTING, supra  note 21, at 46. See  VRA, supra  note 3,
§ 203.
78 It should be noted that section 203 of the VRA applies to Asian Americans, but
not Pacific Islanders.  Hence the abbreviation APIA is not appropriate in this case.
IMPACT OF REDISTRICTING, supra  note 21, at 47.
79 The National Asian Pacific American Legal Consortium (NAPALC), with the
assistance of the Asian American Legal Defense and Education Fund (AALDEF),
the Asian Pacific American Legal Center (APALC), and the Asian Law Caucus
(ALC), compiled a report on the status of bilingual assistance to Asian Pacific
American voters under section 203.  They based their findings on exit polls taken
during the November 1996 election.  The report was released May 18, 1997.  They
found that thousands of APIA voters in New York and California were fully able to
exercise their right to vote.  Exit polls in California revealed that sixty percent of
those using oral assistance were first time voters; in New York, the figure was nearly
fifty percent.  Despite these promising figures, NAPALC found that jurisdictions in
the two states still are not in full compliance with the law.  Problems still exist in the
training of election workers on the election process, section 203 requirements, and
cultural sensitivity.  Also, problems exist in the recruitment and placement of bilin-
gual poll workers.  Poll sites also failed to clearly indicate the availability of assis-
tance.  Translated materials need to be more easily accessible, and translators need
to be more identifiable.
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1910 census to obtain separate figures on other groups such as
Filipinos and Koreans.  However, data on these other groups
were collected on an intermittent basis through the 1970 cen-
sus.  Asian Indians were classified as White and the
Vietnamese population was included in the “Other” race cate-
gory in the 1970 census.
In the 1980 census, there were six separate response categories
for Asians:  Asian Indian, Chinese, Filipino, Japanese, Korean,
and Vietnamese. . . . [F]or Census 2000, a separate “Other
Asian” response category was added with a write-in area for re-
spondents to indicate specific Asian groups not included on the
questionnaire.80
The 2000 Census had a major change with a tremendous po-
tential effect on redistricting.81  For the first time, respondents
could check more than one box in the category for race.82  This
created up to 126 racial and ethnic categories, a significant in-
crease from the nine categories possible in the 1990 Census.83
The opportunity to check more than one box in the racial cate-
gory question was meant to alleviate in part problems faced by
multi-racial respondents.  While it may be clear-cut to some as to
which race they identify with more, the concept of forcing a
multi-racial person to choose only one race denied them an op-
portunity to self-identify.  This lack of choice could have poten-
tially strong cultural and political implications for that
respondent, and, in some cases, it may even prevent them from
responding.  Additionally, if a person checked more than one
race in the past, the Census Bureau made an arbitrary decision
about which race category to which that person would be
assigned.84
By allowing census respondents to “choose,” the Census Bu-
reau theoretically receives more complete data due to a more
comprehensive collection method and a potentially more compli-
ant respondent pool.  Minority group populations will likely gain
80 Barnes & Bennett, supra  note 1, at 2.
81 Another change was the separation of Pacific Islanders into a category separate
from Asians.  In 2000, Pacific Islanders had the opportunity to check a separate box
and indicate their ethnicity/national origin.
82 Barnes & Bennett, supra  note 1, at 2.
83 This change reflects the October 30, 1997 decision by the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget (OMB) to incorporate multiple-race reporting into the federal
statistic system. IMPACT OF REDISTRICTING, supra  note 21, at 36; Barnes & Bennett,
supra  note 1.
84 Barnes & Bennett, supra  note 1, at 3.
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\81-4\ORE402.txt unknown Seq: 22 30-SEP-03 13:46
870 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81, 2002]
numbers because multi-racial persons will not be left out by
choice of the Census Bureau or themselves.  Theoretically, this
increase in numbers subsequently gives minority groups more in-
fluence in districts and ultimately, a better opportunity to elect
candidates of their choice.  The increased accuracy in the PL 94-
171 data on race used by the DOJ for redistricting purposes also
gives legislators a realistic picture of the districts they create,
hopefully improving the redistricting process.
The PL 94-171 data used in the 1990 Census differs signifi-
cantly in composition from that of the 2000 Census.  The decision
to allow persons to check multiple race boxes made the 1990
Census data, as it stood, incompatible with the 2000 data.  The
ability to compare data over time is critical to the enforcement of
civil rights laws as it is to enabling any kind of demographic anal-
ysis.  In order to make this new data comparable to pre-2000
Census racial categories, the government devised a method for
allocating each of the multiple race responses back into a single
race category.85  On March 9, 2000, OMB issued Bulletin No. 00-
02, of which part II addresses how multiple-race responses will
be allocated for use in civil rights monitoring and enforcement
(i.e. the census count).86
The following eight categories represent the new groupings the
DOJ uses for the PL 94-171 Data:
• Non-Hispanic, White (and no other category)
• Non-Hispanic, Black/African American (including all Af-
rican American/White responses)
• Non-Hispanic, Asian (including all Asian/White
responses)
• Non-Hispanic, American Indian/Alaska Native (including
all American Indian-Alaska Native/White responses)
• Non-Hispanic, Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander
(including all Hawaiian or Pacific Islander/White
responses)
85 U.S. Census Bureau, Brief, Overview of Race and Hispanic Origin:  2000 ,
2KBR101-1, March 2001, available at  http://www.census.gov/population/www/cen
2000/briefs.html.
86 United States Dep’t of Justice, Guidance Concerning Redistricting and Retro-
gression Under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act , 42 U.S.C. § 1973c, 66 FED. REG.
5411 (Jan. 18, 2001), available at  http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/voting/sec_5/fedregvoting.
htm (last visited July 3, 2002) [hereinafter Guidance Concerning Redistricting and
Retrogression]. See also NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, REDIS-
TRICTING LAW 2000 (1999); Magpantay, supra  note 1.
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• Non-Hispanic, Some Other Race (including all Some
Other Race/White responses)
• Non-Hispanic, Other Multiple-Race (where more than
one minority race is listed)
• Hispanic87
Any respondent checking both a minority race box and a white
race box is assigned to the minority racial category.88  Thus, the
numbers for Black/African American, Asian, American Indian/
Alaska Native, Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander, and
some “other race” reflect the total of the single race responses
and  the multiple race responses in which the minority race box
and the white race box were checked.89  All respondents chosing
more than one minority race box comprise the “Other Multiple-
Race” category.90  For example, a respondent chosing both
Black/African American and Asian will be assigned to that cate-
gory.  As in the past, the DOJ analyzed Hispanics as a separate
group for purposes of enforcement of the VRA.91
4. Traditional Redistricting Principles
The major court cases of the 1990s discussed in the next sec-
tion highlight the importance of an evolving concept known as
“traditional redistricting principles.”  These principles serve as a
guide and provide a set of “requirements” that must be met by
proposed redistricting plans in order to avoid legal challenges.
They include:
• Compactness and contiguity of districts92
• Respecting political subdivisions93
• Respecting communities of interest94
• Protecting incumbents,95 and
• Meeting political goals.96
87 Barnes & Bennett, supra  note 1, at 2.
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Id.  at 2-3.
91 Id.
92 On the “compactness” requirement, see Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 959-60
(1996); on the “contiguity” requirement, see Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 646 (1993).
93 On the requirement that districts preserve existing political boundaries, see
Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 98 (1997).
94 On the requirement that districts encompass “communities of interest,” see
Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 915 (1995).
95 On protecting incumbents, see Abrams , 521 U.S. at 98.
96 On preserving a political parties dominance via redistricting, see Davis v.
Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
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Compactness refers to the shape of the district—how tightly
the lines are drawn and whether the district’s edges are smooth.97
This requirement may come into conflict with the satisfaction of
the VRA, that requires the creation of “majority-minority” dis-
tricts to avoid minority vote dilution or to comply with section 5
in a covered jurisdiction.98  In order to draw these districts, com-
pact shape may often be sacrificed in order to pull together
enough of the minority group population to form a “majority-
minority” district.  However, in the Shaw v. Reno99 line of cases
discussed in the next section, districts that lack requisite “com-
pactness” may be vulnerable to racial gerrymandering
lawsuits.100
The importance of compactness is based on the idea that politi-
cal representation in our system is linked to the notion that geo-
graphical communities share common interests.  The perception
that elected officials can better serve their constituents if they are
in the same geographic region also contributes to the importance
of compactness.101
No one specific measurement for compactness has been estab-
97 Guidance Concerning Redistricting and Retrogression , supra  note 86.
98 Miller , 515 U.S. 900.  In Miller , the Justice Department withheld preclearance
for Georgia’s 1990 redistricting until Georgia added three majority-minority dis-
tricts, white voters sued and the Court held that evidence that a legislature had used
race as a predominant factor in redistricting triggered strict scrutiny under the Equal
protection clause.
Using as its new test ‘race as a predominant factor’, the Court concluded
that race was the predominant rationale behind the Miller  redistricting
plan.  The Court then invoked strict scrutiny to ascertain whether the plan
was narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.  Deciding that
complying with the Voting Rights Act might be a compelling state interest,
the Court concluded that the plan was not narrowly tailored. . . .[and]
found the districts unconstitutional.
BELL, supra  note 54, at 631; Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996) (Shaw II). Shaw II
rejected the North Carolina’s proffered justifications (to ameliorate the effects of
past discrimination, and to comply with sections 5 and 2 of the VRA for District 12
(first examined by the court in Shaw I) as not compelling state interests (there was
no evidence to show district’s shape with past discrimination, the Court disagreed
with the Justice Department’s interpretation of section 5 and because there was no
geographically compact population, there was no potential for liability under section
2).  Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996).  In Bush , Justice O’Connor stated that using
race as a factor in redistricting does not in and of itself give rise to strict scrutiny,
however, it cannot be a predominant factor. See id.  She also stated that compliance
with section 2 of the VRA could be a compelling state interest, however, districting
would have to be narrowly tailored to survive. See id.
99 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
100 Bush , 517 U.S. 952; Miller , 515 U.S. 900.
101 Guidance Concerning Redistricting and Retrogression , supra  note 86.
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lished.  Only Colorado and Iowa have tried prescribing particular
methods to measure it.102  While a visual test often serves as an
initial means of evaluating compactness in a district, mathemati-
cal formulas also exist to aid in this endeavor.103  The contiguity
requirement simply means that each district is its own “land
mass.”  With the exception of islands and bodies of water, dis-
tricts should not be separated and all parts of the district should
touch.104
A “community of interest” is another principle frequently
cited in redistricting cases.105  This term refers to populations
with common or shared interests.  What constitutes a “commu-
nity of interest” varies, but the following present possible shared
interests:
• Income levels
• Educational backgrounds
• Housing patterns and living conditions (urban, suburban,
rural)
• Cultural and language backgrounds
• Employment and economic patterns
• Health and environmental conditions, and
• Other issues of concern (i.e. crime, education, etc.).106
The census, in conjunction with information from public redis-
tricting hearings and general knowledge of the region, can pro-
102 IMPACT OF REDISTRICTING, supra  note 21, at 23-24.
103 Three of the most commonly used mathematical measures are known as dis-
persion, perimeter, and population.  Dispersion method determines to what extent a
district is spread out by comparing the area of the district to the area of the smallest
circle that can be drawn around it.  The perimeter method measures the length of a
district’s borders—the smoothest borders being the most compact.  Population
method calculates the regularity of distribution of population in and around a dis-
trict by comparing the population inside the district with the population just outside
of the district. Id.  at 24-25.
104 Id.  at 25.
105 On the requirement that districts encompass “communities of interest,” see
Miller , 515 U.S. at 915.
Drawing districts on the basis of Asian American communities of interest is
not simply a legal fiction nor a proxy for race.  Asian American communi-
ties of interest may be viewed as smaller subsets of the Asian American
community.  Race and ethnicity, along with income level, educational level,
English ability, and other socio-economic characteristics, in addition to ex-
ternal factors and common community concerns and issues, must be used
to prove that specific Asian American communities are communities of
interest.
Magpantay, supra  note 1, at 768.
106 Guidance Concerning Redistricting and Retrogression , supra  note 86.
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vide adequate information to determine these “communities of
interest.”
States and local jurisdictions are also permitted to express and
meet political goals, which may include protection of a political
party or incumbent, even if these goals result in majority-minor-
ity districts.107  States may do this even if they are aware of the
race of the voters in the district, as in Hunt v. Cromartie108
(where political gerrymandering was allowed because the most
loyal Democrats happened to be black Democrats).109
Ultimately, redistricting plans need to be consistent within
each state and local jurisdiction.  If certain “traditional redistrict-
ing principles” have been more or less adhered to in the past,
then any plan that differs significantly from the “traditional”
principles of the jurisdiction may be called into question.  Moreo-
ver, “communities” of interest not previously supported by redis-
tricting plans can use the state’s tendency to bend “traditional
redistricting principles” to advocate for compromise of those
principles in their favor.
C. Latina/os and APIA Communities and the 1980s
Redistricting Experience in California
Unfortunately, for many people, particularly in the Latina/o
and APIA communities, redistricting has been a formal and ab-
stract legal process far removed from their daily lives.110  As
such, people in these communities may fail to fully appreciate the
importance of redistricting, let alone even understand what the
process entails.111  This lack of participation leads to redistricting
107 Id.  at 26.
108 526 U.S. 541, 551 (1999).
109 Guidance Concerning Redistricting and Retrogression , supra  note 86.
110 Chung, supra  note 1.
111 For many APIA and Latino communities, even the concept of participation at
the voting booth may be unfamiliar, let alone developing an understanding of the
impact of redistricting.  On traditionally low Asian American voter turnout, see Paul
Ong & Don T. Nakanishi, Becoming Citizens, Becoming Voters:  The Naturalization
and Political Participation of Asian Pacific Immigrants , in REFRAMING THE IMMI-
GRATION DEBATE 292 (Bill Ong Hing & Ronald Lee eds., 1996).
To understand the relatively low electoral participation of Asian Ameri-
cans, one needs to take into account their sizeable foreign-born population.
In 1980 the proportion of foreign-born Asian Americans was 73 percent in
the United States, 67 percent in California, and 63 percent in Los Angeles
County. . . . New immigrants face numerous obstacles that limit their elec-
toral participation, including limited English ability, unfamiliarity with the
political system, and ignorance of the political issues.
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that seriously disadvantages Latina/o and APIA community po-
litical representation on important issues ranging from education,
housing, training programs, medical care, and immigration.112
Disenfranchisement through redistricting takes a few identi-
fied forms.  As mentioned before, legislators or redistricters can
create districts that split or “crack” minority group communities,
preventing them from asserting political strength arising from
their numbers.113  In other instances, where a minority group has
sufficient numbers to influence or even become the majority in
more than one district, legislatures may “pack” them into a single
district to minimize their sphere of influence, so that there will be
a “token” minority representative in the legislature, but who will
always be outvoted on issues of particular interest to the relevant
minority community.114  To avoid these situations, Latina/o and
APIA community members need to become more involved in
the redistricting process.  Civil rights advocacy groups like
MALDEF and APALC can also encourage voter registration
and participation by demonstrating, via outreach and education
YEN LE ESPIRITU, ASIAN AMERICAN PANETHNICITY:  BRIDGING INSTITUTIONS AND
IDENTITIES 57-58 (Sucheng Chan ed., 1992). See also  Sun Bai, supra  note 56, at 739
n.39; Lena H. Sun, Some Asian Americans Fear Reduced Political Involvement After
DNC Flap , WASH. POST, Nov. 20, 1996, at A6.
Low levels of Latino electoral participation have a tendency to be self-
perpetuating.  Once the perception arises that Latinos do not vote, candi-
dates, campaigns, and parties have no reason to reach out to these commu-
nities. Without outreach, the many “new” voters in these communities are
not socialized into the political system and become chronic nonvoters.
Rodolfo O. de la Garza & Louis DeSipio, Save the Baby, Change the Bathwater, and
Scrub the Tub:  Latino Electoral Participation After Seventeen Years of Voting Rights
Act Coverage , 71 TEX. L. REV. 1479, 1508 (1993).
112 Chung, supra  note 1.
113 IMPACT OF REDISTRICTING, supra  note 21, at 18.
When single-member districts are used, representation in the city or the
state as a whole depends on the way the population is geographically dis-
tributed and on how the district or ward lines are drawn. . . . Traditional
techniques of gerrymandering have often determined the composition of a
councilor or a state legislative house, either by bunching (often called
“packing”) partisan, ethnic, or racial groups into a district so that votes
contributing to unnecessarily large majorities are wasted; or by spreading
minority populations thinly across several districts so that they do not con-
stitute a majority in any district (“cracking”).
Barber, supra  note 58, at 66.
114 These two are examples of minority vote dilution.  Whether a claim can be
made that such dilution has occurred depends on a legal showing of a violation of
section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.  The three preconditions to make such a claim
were outlined by the Supreme Court in Thornburg v. Gingles , 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
See IMPACT OF REDISTRICTING, supra  note 21, at 17-18.
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about the redistricting process, to let community members know
how important and valuable their vote is.115
Ultimately, successful involvement in redistricting can lead to
the creation of districts where minority groups are able to elect
representatives of their choice.  Traditionally, these districts have
been “majority-minority” districts, or districts whose “majority”
is comprised of members of different ethnic or racial minority
groups.116
Along with African Americans, Latina/os and APIAs have tra-
ditionally not had a voice in the redistricting process.117  While
there have been and continue to be geographically dense areas of
Latina/o population, prior to the 1990s, there were no areas in
California with concentrated APIA populations that were large
enough to constitute a majority of a district.118  Coupled with the
historically low participation of the APIA community in the po-
litical process, these conditions made legislative decisions to frag-
ment the potential voting power of APIA communities easier.119
The California Legislature’s 1981-82 redistricting resulted in
Los Angeles’ Koreatown neighborhood being split between three
congressional, four senatorial, three assembly, and three city
council districts.120  With the exception of the geographically
small area of Little Tokyo, that remained in one congressional,
senatorial, and assembly district, all other APIA communities in
California were fragmented at one or more levels.121
The Latina/o population had its vote similarly diluted by Los
115 See IMPACT OF REDISTRICTING, supra  note 21; see also  Kim G. Geron &
James S. Lai, Beyond Symbolic Representation: A Comparison of the Electoral Path-
ways and Policy Priorities of Asian American and Latino Elected Officials , 9 ASIAN
L.J. 41 (2002).
116 Barber, supra  note 58, at 131-43; see also  Magpantay, supra  note 1, at 762-63.
117 For instance, the New York City redistricting plan of the 1980s divided China-
town between two state assembly districts.  Despite objections filed by the Asian
American Legal Defense and Education Fund (AALDEF) raising concerns about
the Asian American community’s ability to elect a candidate of its choice, the redis-
tricting plan was approved. IMPACT OF REDISTRICTING, supra  note 21, at 10.
118 AZORES & ONG, supra  note 22, at 4; CAPAFR Fact Sheet: Priorities,
CAPAFR Redistricting , at  http://www.apalc.org/CAPAFR_Priorities.pdf (redistrict-
ing affecting Los Angeles County after the 2000 Census).
119 WILLAIM WEI, THE ASIAN AMERICAN MOVEMENT (1993); Chung, supra  note
1, at 271-72.
120 LELAND T. SAITO, RACE AND POLITICS:  ASIAN AMERICANS, LATINO, AND
WHITES IN A LOS ANGELES SUBURB (1998); WILLIAM TAMAYO, THE VOTING
RIGHTS OF ASIAN AMERICANS 9-10 (1991); see also WEI, supra  note 119.
121 See generally SAITO, supra  note 120.
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Angeles County Supervisoral redistricting.122  MALDEF brought
a groundbreaking lawsuit, Garza v. County of Los Angeles ,123
that forced a redrafting of the county supervisor districts.  Ro-
dolfo Acun˜a writes that,
In June 1990, U.S. District Judge David V. Kenyon, after a
lengthy and costly trial ruled in Garza v. County of Los Ange-
les that the [Los Angeles County Board of] Supervisors had
violated the federal Voting Rights Act by intentionally deny-
ing Latinos an equal opportunity to elect candidates of their
choice to the county Board of Supervisors. . . . The Garza case
revealed much about Euroangelenos and their attitude toward
Mexicans.  Suffering from historical amnesia, many of them
continued to view Latinos as foreigners and questioned the
suit against the Board of Supervisors:  ‘Why should Mexicans
have representation on the board?’  Whites—and often
Blacks—seemed to think that civil rights was not a Latino is-
sue.  Breaking through this historical and institutional igno-
rance was a major challenge. . . . While judges presume
discrimination against African Americans, they tend to see
Chicanos and other Latinos as latecomers without a history of
discrimination or civil rights struggle, and efforts to raise the
history of the Chicano struggle for civil rights are often met
with hostility. . . . [N]umbers alone do not automatically bring
political strength or influence. . . . [but] usually intensify nativ-
ism toward Latinos among Euroamericans.124
Eventually, as a result of the Garza  litigation, the supervisorial
districts were redrawn to create a district where the Latina/o
population had a viable opportunity to elect a candidate of its
choice.  Gloria Molina was elected to the L.A. County’s Board of
Supervisors.
For the APIA community, especially in the 1980s, political
change was not easily achieved through the courts.  Where there
were examples of electoral success, they were usually dependent
on effective cross-racial coalition building.  This was true in the
122 Id.  at 138.
123 Garza v. County of Los Angeles, 918 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1990) (intentional dis-
crimination may be shown if a legislative body chooses fragmentation of a minority
population as an avenue to preserve incumbencies, and there is some injury to the
protected group.); see also  Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986) (to show that
redistricting has a racially discriminatory effect on a minority group, the group must
show (1) that a majority black, Hispanic or other minority single-member district
can be created, and (2) that past racial bloc voting has stopped minority voters from
electing candidates); see also  de la Garza & DiSipio, supra  note 111.
124 RODOLFO F. ACUNA, ANYTHING BUT MEXICAN: CHICANOS IN CONTEMPO-
RARY LOS ANGELES 72-73 (Mike Davis & Michael Sprinker eds., 1997).
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April 1988 election of Judy Chu, a former community activist and
teacher, to the Monterey Park City Council.  Exit polling
[i]ndicated that Chu received 88 percent of the Chinese vote
and 75 percent of the Japanese American vote.  But since
Asian Americans made up only 35 percent of the city’s electo-
rate, success required significant support from others as well.
And Chu got that support, receiving one in three European
American and Latino votes.125
II
1990S—GROWING PAINS
Despite the generally bleak picture that has been painted for
effective representation in their communities, APIA participa-
tion in the 1990 redistricting process resulted in significant gains.
A number of factors led to these early gains.  Population in-
creases, particularly stemming from large numbers of Southeast
Asian immigrants, gave them strength in numbers that were ab-
sent as recently as the 1980s.126  This prompted APIAs to organ-
ize together in an effort to curb redistricting plans that would
dilute their voting strength.127
In California, the 1990 census revealed an APIA population of
approximately ten percent of the total population.128  The state-
wide 1991 Assembly Redistricting plan proposed by the legisla-
ture would have cut the city of Torrance into two districts,
splitting in half an APIA population that had doubled from 1980
to 1990 and constituted over twenty percent of the city popula-
tion.  APALC and other advocacy groups collected testimony
and prepared briefs to present to the California Supreme Court’s
Special Masters, who were determining the boundaries of the
new districts, to push for a unified City of Torrance.  This turned
out to be the only  change accepted by the Special Masters and
incorporated into the approved map.  Their efforts paid off when,
125 WEI, supra  note 119, at 264 (citing APALC’s 1988 Exit Poll); see also  Bill Ong
Hing, Beyond the Rhetoric of Assimilation and Cultural Pluralism:  Addressing the
Tension of Separatism and Conflict in an Immigration-Driven Society , 81 CAL. L.
REV. 863 (1993).  Chu had come to prominence in Monterey Park by leading the
challenge to the city’s English-only sign ordinances—an issue that resonated with
many immigrant communities and progressive voters.
126 BILL ONG HING, MAKING AND REMAKING ASIAN AMERICA THROUGH IMMI-
GRATION POLICY, 1850-1990, at 121-38 (Gordon H. Chang ed., 1993).
127 SAITO, supra  note 120, at 159.
128 TIMOTHY P. FONG, THE CONTEMPORARY ASIAN AMERICAN EXPERIENCE:
BEYOND THE MODEL MINORITY 42 (Charlyce Jones Owen et al. eds., 1998).
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in 1998, the 53rd Assembly District elected George Nakano, a
Japanese American and the only APIA assemblyman from
Southern California at the time.129
In 1990, two coalitions, one in northern California and another
in Los Angeles, each called the Coalition of Asian Pacific Ameri-
cans for Fair Redistricting (CAPAFR), were formed.130  This
marked the first time that the APIA community formally partici-
pated in the redistricting process.  With some communication be-
tween the two regional coalitions, each engaged in providing
public awareness efforts, solicited community involvement, and
developed technical proposals for their respective areas.131
As compared to some other minority groups, the APIA (and
the Latina/o) community is extremely heterogeneous, encom-
passing a wide variety of different cultures, languages, histories
of immigration and socio-economic backgrounds.132
To bridge the diverse interests of different ethnic groups, dif-
ferent generations, and communities with different socio-eco-
nomic backgrounds, and more recent immigrant communities
required finesse and sensitivity on the part of APIA activists, as
well as a commitment to significant and substantial outreach.
129 In New York, the 1991 Congressional redistricting held Latino and APIA vot-
ers together in District 12.  Plaintiffs challenging the constitutionality of this district
under Shaw v. Reno , 509 U.S. 630 (1993), brought suit in Diaz v. Silver , 978 F. Supp.
96 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).  AALDEF represented Asian American voters, intervening in
the suit to defend the district.  They argued that Asian Americans in Manhattan’s
Chinatown and Brooklyn’s Sunset Park constituted a community of interest based
on common language, class, and lifestyle.  The court accepted this argument and
kept the district intact. IMPACT OF REDISTRICTING, supra  note 21, at 12.
130 SAITO, supra  note 120, at 18-20.
131 Tom, supra  note 17, at 2.
132 For the APIA community, the language barrier presents a significant hurdle,
considering the large percentage (sixty-nine percent) of the APIA population who
are foreign-born.  Accordingly, these first efforts resulted in some sucesses, which
will be discussed later.  However, full participation in the redistricting process
eluded the APIA community for a variety of reasons.  Chung, supra  note 1, at 168.
With certain Southeast Asian groups, new immigrants may lack literacy in both En-
glish and their native language.
For many recent immigrants, especially Southeast Asians, their focus may be more
on subsistence and financial survival, causing them to overlook the importance of
politics to their well-being.  Dan Nakanishi, The Next Swing Vote?  Asian Pacific
Americans and California Politics , in RACIAL & ETHNIC POLITICS IN CALIFORNIA
144 (Bryan O. Jackson & Michael B. Preston eds., 1991); Chung, supra  note 1, at
171-72.  These groups stand in stark contrast with those ethnic groups with multiple
generations in the United States, including the more established and politically or-
ganized Japanese American community and portions of the Chinese American pop-
ulation.  Wei, supra  note 119, at 241-70.
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Because of the challenges faced in building a coalition of all the
APIA voices, developing a unified front was not always assured,
even with conscientious efforts to maintain substantive outreach.
For example, the Northern California CAPAFR faced challenges
in uniting all of their constituent voices under one redistricting
plan proposal.  Individuals emerged who lobbied their legislators
about their own district agenda.  This created confusion as to
which CAPAFR group “truly” represented the voice of the
APIA community of California.133
APIAs also lacked a statewide organization with advocacy ex-
perience possessing the stature and history of organizations such
as MALDEF and NAACP-LDF.  Unlike Latinas/os and African
Americans, APIAs lacked a history of successful voting rights
and redistricting litigation that would serve as a potential threat
to legislators that did not address APIA needs.134  By compari-
son, the Latina/o community in California had the litigation re-
cord of MALDEF and other organizations that had effectively
brought several high profile redistricting court cases in the 1980s,
establishing their presence as a community to be reckoned
with.135
Finally, the APIA community was disadvantaged in the 1990s
redistricting process because it could not produce a statewide re-
districting proposal.  Without a statewide organization, the APIA
communities’ interests were represented by two separate re-
gional coalitions—a CAPAFR in the San Francisco/San Jose area
133 See generally  Chung, supra  note 1.
134 SAITO, supra  note 120, at 158-59 (“Historically, politicians have divided geo-
graphic concentrations of racial groups into many districts, diluting their political
influence.  Redistricting was a key issue for Asian Americans, who have experienced
extreme fragmentation under previous plans.  There was no Asian American in the
120-member state legislature between 1980 and 1992.”).
135 See ACUNA, supra  note 124, at 152.  This litigation success cannot be underes-
timated.  MALDEF’s representation of Latino voters, using the Voting Rights Act’s
sections 2 and 5, created a strong incentive for legislators to negotiate.
MALDEF was established in 1968 to use advocacy and litigation for social
change in education, employment, and politics based on the model estab-
lished by the NAACP and its independent Legal Defense Fund . . . . Some
of MALDEF’s major cases involving politics include victories against at
large elections in the Supreme Court case White v. Register  (1973), involv-
ing the Texas House of Representatives, and the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals decision Gomez v. City of Watsonville  (1988), involving city coun-
cil elections.  Victories against gerrymandered districts include United
States and Carillo v. Los Angeles  and Garza v. The County of Los Angeles
in the 1980s .
SAITO, supra  note 120, at 138-39.
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and a CAPAFR in the Los Angeles area.136  Since there was no
true statewide coordination, each CAPAFR group could only
present proposals for a few districts in the region.  A lack of
APIA representatives in the California legislature, a lack of un-
derstanding about the APIA electorate, and a lack of a statewide
APIA voice made it easy for legislators to ignore APIA interests
in the 1990s.  Instead, legislators responded to party and incum-
bant interests as well as to minority groups such as MALDEF
and the Black Legislative Caucus Members led by Willie Brown
Jr. as the Speaker of the Assembly.137
While CAPAFR’s success was limited by its lack of a statewide
proposal, CAPAFR was able to achieve a modicum of influence
by working with MALDEF.  CAPAFR in Southern California fo-
cused on an APIA community of interest made up of the four
cities in Los Angeles’ San Gabriel Valley with large and fast
growing Asian American populations.  APALC and MALDEF
worked to hold the four cities—Monterey Park, Alhambra,
Rosemead, and San Gabriel—together within the largely Latina/
o 49th Assembly District.138  Because Latinas/os constituted a
large percentage of the population and APIAs had a sufficiently
large and growing population, any candidate would need to make
coalitions with both Latinas/os and APIAs in order to run a suc-
cessful campaign.  This also opened the possibility that a strong
APIA candidate could emerge who had worked at building these
coalitions and thus was positioned to win.  That was the case in
2000, when Judy Chu won election to the California Assembly
representing the 49th District.
In the end, the Democratic State Legislature and Republican
Governor Pete Wilson could not agree on the redistricting plan,
thereby relinquishing the task of redrawing the lines to the
courts.139  Although CAPAFR’s lack of a statewide organized ef-
136 Tom, supra  note 17, at 2.
137 Id.
138 SAITO, supra  note 120; TIMOTHY P. FONG, THE FIRST SUBURBAN CHINA-
TOWN: THE REMAKING OF MONTEREY PARK CALIFORNIA (1994).
139 FONG, supra  note 138; JOHN HORTON, THE POLITICS OF DIVERSITY:  IMMI-
GRATION, RESISTANCE, AND CHANGE IN MONTEREY PARK, CALIFORNIA (1995);
SAITO, supra  note 120. See also NATIONAL ASIAN PACIFIC AMERICAN POLITICAL
ALMANAC (Don T. Nakanishi & James C. Lai eds., 10th ed. 2001-02); Pei-te Lien,
Ethnicity and Political Participation:  A Comparison Between Asian and Mexican
Americans , 16 POLITICAL BEHAVIOR 237 (1994); Nakanishi, supra  note 132, at 144;
Vincent Parillo, Asian Americans in American Politics , in AMERICA’S ETHNIC
POLITICS 89 (Joseph S. Roucek & Bernard Eisenberg eds., 1982); Carole J. Uhlaner
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fort hurt them during their presentations to the state legislature,
their arguments before the California Supreme Court’s Special
Masters enabled them to win a significant victory in the 53rd As-
sembly District in the South Bay of Los Angeles County.
CAPAFR of Southern California successfully argued that Tor-
rance’s APIA community, which had doubled in population from
1980 to 1990, should be kept together within a district.140  Their
testimony resulted in the only change made to the Assembly map
by the Special Masters and ultimately in the election of George
Nakano in 1998.  Mr. Nakano was the only APIA assembly mem-
ber in Southern California at the time.
Much was to be gleaned from the participation of APIAs for
the first time in the redistricting process in the 1990s.  First, the
lack of a true statewide proposal undoubtedly hurt APIA inter-
ests when presenting to the legislature.  More unity in CAPAFR,
along with a larger sphere of influence, was in order for 2000-
2001.  Second, these additional regional intragroup coalitions
needed to be inclusive enough for APIA’s to present a unified
voice, requiring a great deal of organization and networking
across the APIA community.  Finally, as suggested by
CAPAFR’s collaboration with MALDEF in holding together an
APIA community of interest in the San Gabriel Valley of Los
Angeles County, the APIA community needed to commit to a
strategy that embraced building and sustaining intergroup cross-
racial coalitions.141
et al., Political Participation of Ethnic Minorities in the 1980s , 11 POLITICAL BEHAV-
IOR 195 (1989); Carole J. Uhlaner, Political Participation and Discrimination:  A
Comparative Study of Asians, Blacks, and Latinos , in POLITICAL PARTICIPATION
AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 138 (William Crotty ed., 1991). See also  Tania Azores
& Philip Okamoto, Asian Pacific American Awareness and Involvement in Redistrict-
ing  (UCLA Asian Am. Studies Center 1991); Paul Ong et al., Redistricting and Polit-
ical Empowerment of Asian Pacific Americans in Los Angeles:  A Position Paper
(UCLA Asian Am. Studies 1991); TAMAYO, supra  note 120. See generally supra
note 30 and accompanying text.
140 Torrance’s APIA community included a large Japanese American population
that was well established and had a consistent voting record that made it a cogniza-
ble community of interest.  Additionally, the city of Torrance was a large South Bay
interest, with a fully functioning independent City Council and school system.
141 On the difficulty of building and sustaining intergroup coalitions, see James A.
Regalado, Community Coalition-Building , in THE LOS ANGELES RIOTS:  LESSONS
FOR THE URBAN FUTURE 230 (Mark Baldassare ed., 1994).
Coalition failures in this period have been due to a combination of concep-
tual, structural and organizational problems:  (1) improperly understanding
the complexity of race and class relations and issues . . . inclusive of a reli-
ance on and not going beyond building middle class membership and con-
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Groups like MALDEF and NAACP-LDF had much more ex-
perience in the redistricting process than CAPAFR, and much
could be learned from working with these groups.  Also, a uni-
fied proposal presenting the interests of all three groups would
eliminate the possibility that individual group interests would be
pitted against each other by the legislature.  More importantly, a
cross-racial coalition strategy would embody the larger goal of
achieving voting rights through adherence to larger social justice
principles.  In the 2001 round of redistricting, grass-roots work
addressing both intra-group and inter-group unity proved benefi-
cial for APIA interests in the redistricting process.
III
2000-2001—THE EMERGENCE OF AN APIA
POLITICAL PRESENCE
By the year 2000, the United States’ in general, and Califor-
nia’s, in particular, demographic landscape underwent important
changes.142  The growth rates of minority group populations, par-
ticularly the APIA and Latina/o communities, made California a
state with no majority population.143  Stated another way, Cali-
fornia is now a racially pluralist state.  These demographic
stituencies; (2) becoming too comfortable with critically unchallenged
concepts of pluralism and multiculturalism; (3) being oblivious to the de-
gree to which traditional theories and beliefs of representative democracy
and public policy formation are not working for communities of color; (4)
failures to broadly recognize and confront the degree to which anti-demo-
cratic corporatist approaches have failed those most in need of economic
development and job creation; (5) failure to set clear and strategic goals,
realizable objectives, and targeted activities and outcomes; and (6) being
unwilling to overcome provincial outlooks and agendas.
Id. See also  Eric K. Yamamoto, Rethinking Alliances:  Agency, Responsibility and
Interracial Justice , 3 ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 33 (1995).
142 Barnes & Bennett, supra  note 1, at 4.
Census 2000 showed that the United States population was 281.4 million on
April 1, 2000.  Of the total, 11.9 million, or 4.2 percent, reported Asian.
This number included 10.2 million people, or 3.6 percent, who reported
only Asian and 1.7 million people, or 0.6 percent, who reported Asian as
well as one or more other races. . . . The Asian population exceeded the
U.S. level of 4.2 percent of the total population in nine states.  Five states
were in the West—Hawaii (58 percent), California (12 [sic] percent), Wash-
ington (6.7 percent), Nevada (5.6 percent), and Alaska (5.2 percent); two
states were in the Northeast—New Jersey and New York (both 6.2 per-
cent); and two states were in the South—Maryland (4.5 percent) and Vir-
ginia (4.3 percent).
Id.
143 Id.
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changes, along with changes in the law and political climate, cre-
ated a new environment for the 2000-2001 California redistricting
process.144  The following sections elaborate these changes, with
the last section providing a closer look at the role CAPAFR and
organizations like APALC played in engaging the APIA commu-
nity in a relatively successful redistricting process.
A. Demographics
The 2000 Census revealed that, at a 47.53% growth rate, the
APIA community is the fastest growing ethnic community in
California.145  According to the PL 94-171 data, APIAs represent
11.81% of the total population in California.146  This figure of
nearly twelve percent marked a significant increase from the
9.11% recorded in the 1990 Census.147
Given the lessons learned from the 1990 process and the in-
creased population in several other major cities, APALC made a
commitment to build a stronger, more unified CAPAFR that
would help build representation in areas beyond Los Angeles
and San Francisco.148  For the 2000-01 redistricting campaign,
APALC expanded CAPAFR to include nine regions covering
seven counties in California:  Sacramento, San Francisco, Ala-
meda, Santa Clara, Los Angeles Metro, L.A. South Bay, L.A.
San Gabriel Valley, Orange County, and San Diego.149
144 See  Timothy A. Hodson, Ph.D., Disappearing Constraints:  Voting Rights and
Gerrymandering in 1991 and 2001 , CAL. POL. & POL’Y 67 (1998).
145 Tom, supra  note 17, at 3. See also  Appendix A.
146 This figure, as well as the other demographic data in this report, refers to the
Department of Justice (DOJ) measure for population data.  This is the data used by
the DOJ to evaluate redistricting submissions under section 5 of the Voting Rights
Act.  Thus, the Asian Pacific American Legal Center uses this data for its redistrict-
ing proposals.  However, one might run across the figure 12.5% for percent APIAs
in California.  This figure is an inclusive percentage which incorporates all multi-
racial APIAs, specifically those who check both an APIA and Hispanic box on the
census. See  Appendix A for complete demographic data on the APIA population in
California for both the 1990 and 2000 Census counts.
147 By comparison, California’s white, Latino, and African American populations
were 46.70%, 32.38%, and 6.70%, respectively.  U.S. Census Bureau, P010:  His-
panic Origin by Race—Universe: Persons , American FactFinder , available at  http://
factfinder.census.gov/servlet/DTTable?ds_name‡&geo_id=D&mt_name=DEC_
1990_STF1_Po1o&_lang=en (July 3, 2002).
148 ASIAN PAC. AM. LEGAL CENTER, COALITION OF ASIAN PACIFIC AMERICANS
FOR FAIR REDISTRICTING, EXECUTIVE REPORT 1 (2002) [hereinafter CAPAFR RE-
DISTRICTING EXECUTIVE REPORT].
149 For maps of preexisting districts, proposed districts, and actual post-2000 dis-
tricts, see Appendix D. See also  Leon Drovin Keith, Asians Seek New Districts for
Clout , SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Aug. 10, 2001, at 27A.
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The selection of these regions came at no surprise given the
demographical data.  Seven of the top eight largest APIA popu-
lations by county are CAPAFR counties.150  Four CAPAFR
counties rank in the top ten for percentage increase in APIA
population.151  Furthermore, the three non-county CAPAFR re-
gions are a part of Los Angeles County, which has the largest
APIA population in the state and nation.152  The following dem-
ographic data illustrates the significant increases of APIA pres-
ence in these communities.
Sacramento County .  In 1990, Sacramento County had 92,131
APIAs, or about 8.85% of the total population.153  The 2000
Census revealed a population of 150,706, or 12.32%.154  The
APIA population in Sacramento grew 63.58% in the ten years
separating the two census counts.155
San Francisco, Alameda, and Santa Clara Counties .  San Fran-
cisco County had 205,686 APIAs in 1990, representing 28.41% of
the county population.156  By 2000, the population had grown
21.11%.157  The 249,109 APIAs now represent 32.07% of San
Francisco.158  Alameda County, which includes the city of Oak-
land, boasted one of the highest APIA growth rates of all the
CAPAFR regions.159  The 2000 Census revealed 318,543 APIAs,
an increase of 72.36% from the 184,813 APIAs in 1990.160  The
county’s APIA population now represents 22.06%, an increase
from 14.45% in 1990.161  Santa Clara, which includes the city of
San Jose and the Silicon Valley cities of Santa Clara, Cupertino,
and Mountain View, had the highest APIA growth rate of the
nine CAPAFR regions.162  The 1990 Census showed 251,496
APIA persons (16.79% of the total population).163  This figure
jumped to 450,278 persons (26.76% of the total population), an
150 See  Appendix A.
151 See  Appendix A.
152 See  Appendix A.
153 United States Census Bureau, United States Census 2000 , at 39-44, available at
http://ftp.census.gov [hereinafter Census 2000]; see also  Appendix A.
154 Census 2000 , supra  note 153, at 39-44; see also  Appendix A.
155 Census 2000 , supra  note 153, at 39-44; see also  Appendix A.
156 Census 2000 , supra  note 153, at 39-44; see also  Appendix A.
157 Census 2000 , supra  note 153, at 39-44; see also  Appendix A.
158 Census 2000 , supra  note 153, at 39-44; see also  Appendix A.
159 Census 2000 , supra  note 153, at 39-44; see also  Appendix A.
160 Census 2000 , supra  note 153, at 39-44; see also  Appendix A.
161 Census 2000 , supra  note 153, at 39-44; see also  Appendix A.
162 Census 2000 , supra  note 153, at 39-44; see also  Appendix A.
163 Census 2000 , supra  note 153, at 39-44; see also  Appendix A.
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increase of 79.04%.164
L.A. County .  In 2000, Los Angeles County boasted the largest
APIA population (1,200,521, or 12.61% of L.A. County) of the
nine regions.165  This figure reflects a 32.24% increase from the
1990 total of 907,810 (10.24% of the county).166  A significant
portion of the increase can be attributed to the growth in L.A.
County’s San Gabriel Valley, another CAPAFR region.167  As
defined by CAPAFR, the San Gabriel Valley’s main APIA com-
munity of interest comprises four main cities:  Alhambra, Mon-
terrey Park, Rosemead, and San Gabriel.168
In 1990, the 95,980 APIAs represented 41.44% of the popula-
tion in these four cities.169  The 2000 Census saw APIAs increase
to 124,082, or 51.88%.170  This growth rate of 29.28% may not be
the highest of the nine regions, but is important because APIAs
are now a majority in these four cities and a significant popula-
tion in the surrounding region.  These four cities were united in
1991; the 2001 effort sought to ensure this unity and add addi-
tional communities of APIA growth.171
L.A. Metro .  CAPAFR’s efforts in the Los Angeles Metro
Area focused mainly on unifying the ethnically cohesive commu-
nities of Chinatown, Koreatown, Little Tokyo, and Philippine
Town so that each would be made whole rather than being
“cracked” between districts.172
L.A. County South Bay .  L.A. County’s South Bay region,
which produced California’s only APIA assembly member in the
1990s, saw a relatively modest population gain of 19.62%.173  As
CAPAFR did in the San Gabriel Valley, CAPAFR focused on
four cities—Torrance, Gardena, Carson, and Long Beach—when
addressing the needs of the region.174  Whereas APIAs com-
164 Census 2000 , supra  note 153, at 39-44; see also  Appendix A.
165 Census 2000 , supra  note 153, at 39-44; see also  Appendix A.
166 Census 2000 , supra  note 153, at 39-44; see also  Appendix A.
167 Census 2000 , supra  note 153, at 39-44; see also  Appendix A.
168 Census 2000 , supra  note 153, at 39-44; see also  Appendix A.
169 Census 2000 , supra  note 153, at 39-44; see also  Appendix A.
170 Census 2000 , supra  note 153, at 39-44; see also  Appendix A.
171 See Appendix B for a detailed table on the populations in the Los Angeles
County’s San Gabriel Valley.
172 ASIAN PAC. AM. LEGAL CENTER, OVERVIEW OF STATEWIDE ASSEMBLY
MAP—BY REGION, in CAPAFR REDISTRICTING EXECUTIVE REPORT, supra  note
148, at 3.
173 Census 2000 , supra  note 153, at 39-44; see also  Appendix A.
174 Census 2000 , supra  note 153, at 39-44; see also  Appendix A.
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prised 17.34% of the South Bay in 1990, they now comprised
19.34%.175  Further, APIAs in Torrance now comprise 30.39% of
the city population, underscoring their ability to elect George
Nakano in 1998.176
Orange County .  Orange County contains another one of the
fastest growing APIA populations, featuring a ten-year growth
rate of over seventy percent.  The 1990 Census revealed 240,756
persons of APIA descent, or 9.99%.177  The 2000 Census showed
that the 415,030 APIAs in Orange County now comprise 14.58%,
a 72.39% rate of growth in the ten years separating the two
counts.178  Much of this growth stemmed from emerging popula-
tions in Little Saigon and Koreatown.
San Diego County .  In San Diego, the 2000 Census revealed
that 284,875 APIAs resided in that county, up from 185,144 in
1990.179  APIAs now comprise 10.12% of the county, an increase
from 7.41% in 1990.180  The APIA community in San Diego saw
their numbers grow 53.87% over the ten-year period.181
APIAs show strong signs of a community whose population is
on the rise.  With growth rates spanning from twenty-one percent
to nearly eighty percent, APIA presence in California could not
be ignored in the post-2000 round of redistricting.182  CAPAFR
sought to ensure that the state legislature’s 2000-01 redistricting
plan would not do so.  In addition to rapidly changing
demographics, there were also significant legal and legislative
changes in voting rights and redistricting.
175 Census 2000 , supra  note 153, at 39-44; see also  Appendix A.
176 The 53rd Assembly District unified Torrance in the 1991 redistricting as re-
ferred to earlier when discussing CAPAFR’s initial experience in the redistricting
process.  A detailed table on the populations in L.A. South Bay can be found in
Appendix C.
177 Census 2000 , supra  note 153, at 39-44; see also  Appendix A.
178 Census 2000 , supra  note 153, at 39-44; see also  Appendix A.
179 Census 2000 , supra  note 153, at 39-44; see also  Appendix A.
180 Census 2000 , supra  note 153, at 39-44; see also  Appendix A.
181 For demographic data from the 1990 Census, see UNITED STATES CENSUS BU-
REAU, AGE AND SEX FOR THE ASIAN OR PACIFIC ISLANDER POPULATION:  1990,
SAN DIEGO COUNTY, CALIFORNIA, at  http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/QTTable?_
ts=62107703130 (last visited Feb. 4, 2003).  The demographic data from the 2000
Census comes from the APALC demographic database, which uses the DOJ mea-
sure for calculating population that was alluded to earlier and will be explained fur-
ther when changes in the law regarding the census are discussed.  This data can be
found in Appendix A.
182 Census 2000 , supra  note 153, at 39-44; see also  Appendix A. .
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B. Law—Existing Redistricting Standards and Recent Changes
Before the 1990s, the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the
VRA required states to be cognizant of race in redistricting in
order to avoid having their plans struck down for dilution of mi-
nority voting strength under the VRA’s section 2.183  In the
1990s, the Supreme Court decided a series of cases that dramati-
cally changed the landscape of voting rights and redistricting.
This trend began in 1993 with Shaw v. Reno .184 Shaw  involved a
situation arising in North Carolina where the state had not seen a
Black representative elected to the state legislature since Recon-
struction, despite having a twenty percent African American vot-
ing age population.185  North Carolina’s Twelfth Congressional
District ran from the northeast to southwest parts of the state,
forming a snake-like pattern that followed the winding route In-
terstate 85 for nearly 160 miles.186  The North Carolina legisla-
ture clearly drew this district in order to concentrate enough
African Americans in a single district to form a majority-African
American district and receive a VRA-required preclearance
from the DOJ.187  The Court struck down the district as a racial
gerrymander, ruling that such gerrymanders are unconstitutional
and are not permissible, even for remedial purposes (such as
compliance with VRA section 5).188
The Court went a step further in June 1995 with its ruling in
Miller v. Johnson .189  Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority,
stated that the Court would use “strict scrutiny” in voting rights
cases to decide whether districts were narrowly tailored to
achieve a compelling state interest.190  This case involved Geor-
gia’s Eleventh District, where the Georgia legislature attempted
to link African Americans in rural Savannah to those in metro-
politan Atlanta.191  Justice Kennedy did not accept the claim that
this district unified actual “communities of interest,” claiming
they were “worlds apart in culture.”192  Taken together, Shaw
183 Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
184 509 U.S. 630 (1993) (Shaw I).
185 See id.
186 See id. ; see also  Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541 (1999) (Shaw III); Shaw v.
Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996) (Shaw II).
187 See Shaw III , 526 U.S. 541; Shaw II , 517 U.S. 899; Shaw I , 509 U.S. 630.
188 See Shaw III , 526 U.S. 541; Shaw II , 517 U.S. 899; Shaw I , 509 U.S. 630.
189 515 U.S. 900 (1995).
190 Id.  at 920; Adams, supra  note 54, at 13.
191 Miller , 515 U.S. 900.
192 Id.
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and Miller  hold that states may not use race as the predominant
factor in creating a redistricting plan and that a court should ap-
ply strict scrutiny when traditional districting principles, such as
incumbency, compactness, contiguity, and respect for political
subdivisions, are subordinated to racial interests in redistricting
plans.193
The Court continued this stance in 1996 with two cases decided
on the same day. In Bush v. Vera ,194 three majority-minority
Congressional districts, two majority-black and one majority-His-
panic, were struck down by the Court.195 Bush v. Vera  stated
that the Texas legislature had focused too much on ethnicity and
too little on “traditional districting principles,”196 and declared
that it was impermissible to use race as a proxy for political party
preference.197
Shaw v. Hunt198 (Shaw II) resulted from the appeal of the
original Shaw  case.  The Court struck down North Carolina’s
Twelfth District again on the same grounds as the three districts
in the Bush v. Vera  case, and iterated a requirement that districts
drawn on the basis of race to increase the voting power of a mi-
nority group must demonstrate a compelling state interest for
justification.199  Furthermore, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated for
the majority that VRA section 2 liability did not exist in this situ-
ation because of a lack of geographical compactness of minority
groups.200  Thus, District 12 became “a[n] unnecessary remedy
[to] a nonexistent violation. . . .”201
Shaw I , Miller , Shaw II , and Bush v. Vera  were important rul-
ings on race and redistricting.  As it stands, if  race plays a large
role in drawing districts that violate traditional redistricting prin-
ciples, a jurisdiction must provide sufficient justification, such as
193 Id. But cf.  Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 241-42 (2001) (holding that to
prevail on a Shaw  claim “[r]ace must not simply have been ‘a motivation for the
drawing of a majority minority district,’” Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 959 (1996)
(emphasis in original), “but ‘the “predominant  factor” motivating the legislature’s
districting decision.’”  Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 547 (1999) (emphasis added
in Easley).  “Plaintiffs must show that a facially neutral law ‘is “unexplainable on
grounds other than race.”’” Id.  at 546.).
194 517 U.S. 952 (1996).
195 Id.
196 ADAMS, supra  note 54, at 13.
197 Redistricting Process Background Information , supra  note 18.
198 517 U.S. 899 (1996).
199 Redistricting Process Background Information , supra  note 18.
200 Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 918 (1996) (Shaw II).
201 MARK MONMONIER, BUSHMANDERS & BULLWINKLES 45 (2001).
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a compelling state interest (obtaining a VRA section 5
preclearance is presumably not  such a compelling interest), for
creating the race-conscious districts.202  Despite the Supreme
Court’s hostility to race-conscious redistricting rules in states like
New York, Florida, Texas, and California, race continues to be a
major preoccupation of the Supreme Court in voting rights and
redistricting cases.  In so ruling, the Supreme Court narrowed the
scope of protections afforded by the Voting Rights Act.
IV
COALITION OF ASIAN PACIFIC AMERICANS FOR FAIR
REDISTRICTING (CAPAFR ) AND THE CALIFORNIA
DEMOCRATIC PARTY:  GOALS AND ACHIEVEMENTS
IN THE REDISTRICTING PROCESS
A. The Political Situation of APIAs
Following the 2000 Census, California’s Democratic Party con-
trolled both the state legislature and the governor’s office.203
This presented a significant challenge to any  interest group, par-
ticularly racial/ethnic civil rights groups such as APALC,
MALDEF and NAACP-LDF, hoping to influence the process
significantly in their favor to the extent that it was not in line with
party interests.204  A presumption existed among the elected
leadership ranks of the legislature at the time that the 2001 redis-
tricting would only further cement Democrats as the dominant
party and incumbents as a whole in the state legislature and Cali-
fornia Congressional delegation.205  Maeley Tom, assessing the
political climate at the time, quoted Sen. President Pro Tem John
L. Burton as saying, “Democratic dominance is so heavy that
there may not be many more Democratic seats to create without
endangering other Democrats.”206  Groups such as APALC,
MALDEF and NAACP-LDF faced the additional hurdle of the
202 IMPACT OF REDISTRICTING, supra  note 21, at 19.
203 See generally  Charles M. Price, New Twist to an Old Game? , STATE GOV’T
NEWS 20 (Aug. 2000); see also UCLA ASIAN PAC. AM. STUDIES CENTER, NATIONAL
ASIAN PACIFIC AMERICAN POLITICAL ALMANAC, 2001-02 (10th ed. 2001).
204 Steve Lawrence, New Districting for Democrats , ASIAN WEEK, Sept. 7, 2001;
Noam Levey, Assembly Issues Redistricting Plan Proposal Preserves Status Quo, In-
cluding Democrat Dominance , SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Aug. 30, 2001, at 21A.
205 See , e.g. , Carl Ingram, Democrats Have Luck of Draw in Redistricting , L.A.
TIMES, Aug. 19, 2001, at pt. 2, p. 7; Steve Lawrence, Plan Protects Demo’s Seats , THE
DAVIS ENTERPRISE (Davis, Cal.), Aug. 30, 2001; Tom, supra  note 17, at 1.
206 See  Tom, supra  note 17, at 1.
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\81-4\ORE402.txt unknown Seq: 43 30-SEP-03 13:46
Voting Matters:  APIAs, Latinas/os and Post-2000 Redistricting in California 891
unsettled state of judicial pronouncements on the relevance of
race as a factor in redistricting.  As explained in the previous sec-
tion on law and court cases in the 1990s, race may be a factor in
redistricting, but not the dominant  factor.207  This distinction is
still being clarified in the courts, leaving a gray area that will only
be cleared up by further litigation or legislation.
In the 1990s, APIAs saw their population grow at a faster rate
than any other racial/ethnic group over the past ten years.  In
spite of the difficulties presented by the political situation in
2001, APIA leaders felt their population increase and a stronger,
more organized CAPAFR would put them in a better position to
influence post-2000 redistricting.  APALC also strategically used
the emerging redistricting concept of “communities of interest”
as an organizing tool for APIA communities to arbitrate their
unique community characteristics and, where relevant, their
shared political destiny with other APIAs or communities of
color.  Their advocacy efforts were also strengthened by the pres-
ence of APIA assembly members and the Asian Pacific Ameri-
can Legislative Staff.  George Nakano, one of four APIAs in the
Assembly (representing the 53rd District in the South Bay), also
served on the Assembly Election and Reapportionment Commit-
tee.208  The other members of the APIA Legislative Caucus in-
cluded Wilma Chan (16th Assembly District), Carol Liu (44th
Assembly District), and Judy Chu (49th Assembly District).  This
represented the largest coalition of APIAs in the state legisla-
ture.  As we will soon see, an expanded CAPAFR was able to
effect change in a redistricting process mired by an unfavorable
climate in the legislature and governor’s office.
B. Lessons from Post-1990 Redistricting
Recognizing that the APIA community needed more thorough
preparation for the 2000 Redistricting process, the organizing to
re-start CAPAFR began early.  In 1998, under the leadership of
APALC, they created a widespread network of APIA communi-
ties organized around the 2000 Census.209  CAPAFR absorbed
nearly every major APIA organization spanning community, civil
rights, and public policy activities that were potentially interested
207 See id.
208 Id.
209 Id.  at 2.
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in redistricting.210  Their efforts produced nine regional coali-
tions:  Sacramento, San Francisco, Alameda, Santa Clara, Los
Angeles Metro, Los Angeles San Gabriel Valley, Los Angeles
South Bay, Orange County, and San Diego.211  The unity within
the organization proved vital in validating CAPAFR’s political
presence in the state capitol.212  Ultimately, CAPAFR sought to
overcome the major barriers that the APIA community faced in
the 1991 redistricting and began developing the ability to speak
with one voice on redistricting.213
C. Post-2000 Objectives
APALC took a proactive position to organize CAPAFR.  As
early as April 2000, APALC began meeting with community-
based APIA groups in each region to set up redistricting training.
In October 2000, APALC convened the first statewide meeting
of representatives from each region.  They met to discuss local
regional priorities that would be expressed collectively in a state-
wide Assembly map proposal.  APALC’s early start to this pro-
cess enabled them to visit more than once to help refine each
regional proposal.  In spring and summer 2001, they assisted in
the preparation and presentation of community testimony before
six out of the eight Assembly Committee on Elections, Reappor-
tionment, and Constitutional Amendments Committee regional
hearings.214  Working together with the other organizations in
CAPAFR, APALC set out to accomplish the following goals:  (1)
fair representation; (2) coalition building; and (3) political
empowerment.215
1. Fair Representation
Fair representation meant organizing the APIA community in
each of the nine target regions to ensure that the corresponding
regional CAPAFR accurately represented the diversity in com-
210 Id. See also  Neela Banerjee, Maps, Lines and Growing Red Tape:  Political
Activists Push for More API Representation , ASIAN WEEK, May 25-31, 2001, availa-
ble at  http://www.asianweek.com/2001_05_25/bay2_redistricting.html; Leon Drouin
Keith, Asians Seek New Districts for Clout , SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Aug. 10,
2001, at 27A.
211 Tom, supra  note 17.
212 Id.
213 Id.
214 Kathay Feng, Interim Report on Redistricting Work:  Report Period 07/01/00-
06/30/01  (APALC 2001), at 1.
215 CAPAFR REDISTRICTING EXECUTIVE REPORT, supra  note 148, at 1.
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position of the community.216  First and foremost, APALC devel-
oped a process that sought inclusion of all community groups and
members, with special attention to traditionally excluded ethnic
and other groups.  By committing to an inclusive process,
APALC helped CAPAFR develop a more representative voice
for APIAs.  APALC employed the concept of “communities of
interest” in trainings to allow community members to express
what bound their communities together, what interests were im-
portant, and what other communities shared those interests.
APALC also conducted voter research on preferences and needs
(i.e. bilingual assistance).  In March and November 2000,
APALC conducted exit polls of APIA voting behavior in South-
ern California.217  The March 2000 Exit Poll surveyed 3000 voters
in fourteen cities/areas in Los Angeles and Orange Counties.218
The November 2000 Exit Poll surveyed 5000 voters in sixteen
Southern California cities/areas, representing the largest sample
of voters APALC had surveyed to date.219  These exit poll results
were vital to analyzing the patterns of voting and voting chal-
lenges facing APIA voters.220
Fair representation also meant strengthening CAPAFR’s tech-
nical capacity.  Because previous efforts at proposals were only
regional, a significant increase in mapping and data collection
was in order this time around.  The APALC research and demo-
graphic team that created the maps used for the statewide redis-
tricting network trainings, trained under the guidance of Leo
Estrada, MALDEF’s chief demographer and redistricting expert
in the 1990s.  Since APALC’s staff were also trained alongside
MALDEF’s new redistricting staff, this also presented an excel-
lent opportunity for intergroup networking with an experienced
key player in the redistricting process.221
2. Cross-Racial Coalition-Building
The second goal of CAPAFR, coalition building, became rela-
216 Id.
217 Survey Says . . . A Report of the Asian Pacific American Legal Center’s Exit
Poll Project , APALC:  Voting Rights/Anti-Discrimination Unit, Mar. 2002, available
at  http://www.apalc.org/Exit_Poll_Newsletter.pdf [hereinafter Survey Says]. See
also UCLA ASIAN AMERICAN STUDIES CENTER, 2001-02 NAT’L ASIAN PAC. AM.
POLITICAL ALMANAC, 36-41 (Don T. Nakanishi & James S. Lai, Ph.D. eds., 2001).
218 Survey Says , supra  note 217, at 2.
219 UCLA ASIAN AMERICAN STUDIES CENTER, supra  note 217, at 36.
220 Feng, supra  note 214, at 6.
221 Id.
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tively easier to achieve due to the joint training sessions.  By re-
ceiving the same training on mapping software, the maps
produced by CAPAFR would be readily compatible with those of
MALDEF, and vice-versa.  The dramatic changes in the legal
and political landscape governing redistricting warranted a more
collective effort to shape the legislature’s plan.  Recall the atti-
tude among legislators that this process would only further ce-
ment California Democrats and all incumbents into positions of
power, thus precluding significant advance to racial/ethnic civil
rights groups interested more in fair representation than Demo-
cratic Party hegemony such as APALC, MALDEF, and
NAACP-LDF.222  Thus, APALC engaged in strong efforts to
strengthen ties with other redistricting stakeholders.  They regu-
larly convened meetings with groups like MALDEF, Southwest
Voters, Antonio Velasquez Institute, NAACP-LDF, NAACP, the
League of Women Voters, the Pat Brown Institute, Lawyers’
Committee for Civil Rights, and the American Jewish Commit-
tee to share information, understand each other’s concerns, and
explore possible strategies for collaboration.223
In December 2000, APALC facilitated a joint meeting with
staff members and researchers from the major California civil
rights organizations.  Representatives from all three major civil
rights organizations (APALC, MALDEF, NAACP-LDF) dis-
cussed plans for synchronizing efforts as well as providing the
means for ongoing, regular meetings.224  These meetings eventu-
ally blossomed into a collaboration on a joint redistricting hand-
book, entitled THE IMPACT OF REDISTRICTING IN YOUR
COMMUNITY:  A GUIDE TO REDISTRICTING.225
The collaboration on the redistricting handbook set the stage
for a full day conference, entitled “Making Our Communities
Count:  United for a Fair Redistricting Process,” jointly spon-
sored by APALC, NAPALC, NAACP-LDF, and MALDEF.
This conference targeted community leaders, organizers, and in-
terested constituents to discuss the importance of collaboration
222 See , e.g. , A.G. Block, Puzzle Pieces Together , CAL. J., Mar. 2001, at 11;
Michael Finnegan, Latinos May Gain Few Seats in Redistricting , L.A. TIMES, Aug.
26, 2001, at B1; Noam Levey, Davis Ok’s New District Maps , SAN JOSE MERCURY
NEWS, Sept. 28, 2001, at 1B.
223 Feng, supra  note 214, at 2.
224 Id.  at 3.
225 IMPACT OF REDISTRICTING, supra  note 21.  A copy of this handbook, which
has been cited throughout this Essay, can be ordered at http://www.napalc.org.
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and coalition.  Attendees engaged in mapping exercises, dis-
cussed the effects of changes in redistricting law and litigation
strategies, and most importantly, interacted with one another.226
The event took place May 12, 2001 in Los Angeles, with many
CAPAFR regional representatives attending and taking the op-
portunity to meet with their counterparts from other ethnic com-
munities.  Throughout the summer, the three organizations
continued working on a statewide Assembly district map.  This
effort culminated in the first unified Assembly proposal
presented before the Assembly Committee on Elections, Reap-
portionment, and Constitutional Amendments on September 4,
2001.227
3. Political Empowerment
Political empowerment, the third goal of CAPAFR in the 2001
Redistricting process, involved preparing regional CAPAFRs to
present at hearings, to legislators, and to the media to ensure
APIA community and coalition interests were represented in the
redistricting process.228  To this end, the APALC developed a
strategy of training and building up regional partners in three
phases:  (1) developing awareness; (2) providing legal training
and mapping workshops; and (3) organizing strategic planning
meetings.229
In spring 2000, APALC began the first phase of outreach
meetings intended to pique the interest of key community orga-
nizations for the redistricting process.  This initial phase consisted
of an overview of the law, current political climate, and demo-
graphic changes that have spurred a new level of APIA commu-
nity involvement.230  Its purpose was to ensure that the second
226 Id.
227 Joint Hearing Assembly Elections, Reapportionment & Constitutional Amend-
ments Committee & Senate Elections & Reapportionment Committee , (Cal. 2001)
(Transcript of Public Hearing on Redistricting), available at  http://www.assembly.ca.
gov/acs/committee/C7/transcripts/ercapht0904.pdf.
228 CAPAFR REDISTRICTING EXECUTIVE REPORT, supra  note 148, at 1.
229 Feng, supra  note 214, at 4.
230 In Northern California, the Alameda/Contra Costa County efforts were facili-
tated by the East Bay Voter Education Committee, Sacramento County by a com-
munity coalition of over fifty groups known as CAPITAL, San Francisco by the
Asian Law Caucus and APIA Health Forum, and Santa Clara/Silicon Valley by the
Asian Law Alliance.  In Southern California, APALC worked with coalitions of in-
terested constituents in Los Angeles County’s three regions, Orange County Asian
Pacific Islander Community Alliance assisted Orange County, and Southwest
Center for Asian Pacific Law (SCAPL) supported groups in San Diego County. Id.
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phase had ample participation from a wide range of participants.
Phase two trained participants in redistricting law and termi-
nology, eventually engaging them in map drawing exercises.
Since this phase was intended to identify communities of interest,
subsequent meetings were needed in each region.  APALC’s
demographic research team presented maps with overlays of par-
ticular demographic data, from which participants discussed cre-
ating maps specific to their region.  These maps merged together
into a final proposal from each region.231
Once the regional coalitions could coherently express their re-
gional interests with a unified voice, APALC began Phase Three:
solidifying the regional coalitions into a statewide network and
engaging in both regional and statewide strategic planning.232
This effort culminated in the first statewide meeting in October
2000.  In spring and summer 2001, APALC assisted each region
in preparing and presenting cogent community testimony at six
out of eight Assembly Committee on Elections, Reapportion-
ment, and Constitutional Amendments’ regional hearings.233
The benefits of political empowerment stem beyond the obvi-
ous gains of a unified statewide proposal and more representa-
tion of APIA communities of interest in the redistricting plan.
The regional CAPAFR’s involvement in the statewide redistrict-
ing process enabled several of the groups to take on other levels
of redistricting specific to their region.  Sacramento, Santa Clara
(San Jose), San Diego, Orange County, and Los Angeles’ San
Gabriel Valley organized around city or county redistricting, and
several of the regional CAPAFRs testified on senate and con-
gressional redistricting as well.234
Political empowerment extends beyond the redistricting realm.
As mentioned before when discussing the benefits of redistrict-
ing, communities benefit from more educated and involved con-
stituents with a stronger ability to advocate on their behalf.
Ultimately, those non-voting citizens who choose to vote as a re-
sult of this process reflect the far-reaching positive gains that re-
districting can have in increasing the political participation of
231 See  maps in Appendix D.
232 Feng, supra  note 214, at 5.
233 John Ellis, Valley Residents Want Politics Out of Redistricting , THE FRESNO
BEE, May 12, 2001, at B1; Carl Ingram, The State Democrats Have Luck of Draw in
Redistricting , L.A. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2001, at B7; Aurelio Rojas, Asian Americans Flex
Political Muscle , THE SACRAMENTO BEE, May 22, 2001, at A3.
234 Rojas, supra  note 233, at A3.
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APIA community.235
D. Influence on the Post-2000 Redistricting Process
The preparation of APALC and other regional organizations
under the umbrella of CAPAFR worked towards the toughest
battle of the redistricting process:  influence.  While community
awareness and consistent messages were vital to the APIA com-
munity, ultimately CAPAFR needed to connect their collective
interests with that of state legislators on the Assembly Commit-
tee for Elections, Reapportionment, and Constitutional Amend-
ments.  As articulated to the legislature, their two main goals
were “defensive” and “districts that would fairly represent
[APIA] communities.”236
To that end, CAPAFR demonstrated political savvy by recog-
nizing that redistricting is essentially a political insider’s game.  In
order for CAPAFR to be considered a prominent player in the
redistricting process, the organization needed a daily presence in
Sacramento to compete with the other stakeholders’ presence
and, more importantly, to be positioned to respond immediately
to changing circumstances.237  CAPAFR addressed this issue by
hiring a professional political consultant, Maeley Tom, to provide
this political presence within the state capitol at the onset of the
process.238  Ms. Tom served as a liaison to key legislative mem-
bers and staff as needed.239  The key benefit of Ms. Tom’s work
came in the form of valuable strategic and tactical advice on how
to focus and shape CAPAFR’s message to legislators—insight
that only a seasoned political veteran could provide.240
CAPAFR used the network created by both their individual
efforts and that of their political consultant to strategically en-
gage in strong advocacy and to fight for the representation of
existing APIA communities.  During one of the most heated de-
bates involving Assembly District 49 (the East Los Angeles and
San Gabriel Valley area represented by Judy Chu), CAPAFR tes-
timony at hearings, their meetings with legislators, as well as
their strong alliance with MALDEF were primarily responsible
235 Chung, supra  note 1.
236 Tom, supra  note 17, at 3.
237 Id.
238 Feng, supra  note 214.
239 Id.  at 4.
240 Id.
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for a fair resolution.241
CAPAFR also called in ethnic and mainstream media to help
publicize these issues in order to exert additional political pres-
sure on the decision-makers.242  CAPAFR’s advocacy efforts
were further strengthened by the presence of the Asian Legisla-
tive Staff Caucus, led by Assemblyman George Nakano (53rd
Assembly District), who also served on the Assembly Committee
for Elections, Reapportionment, and Constitutional Amend-
ments.  The presence of Nakano and three other APIA Assem-
bly members, especially during behind the scenes redistricting
negotiations, proved vital in enhancing the strength and voice of
the APIA community.243
In spite of all the strategic planning and effort, CAPAFR still
faced an uphill struggle influencing the legislature, given its pre-
disposition to redrawing districts to solidify incumbent protec-
tion.  However, CAPAFR still managed to take more victories
than losses.244  CAPAFR proposed their first statewide Assembly
district plan, balancing APIA community priorities with other
“communities of interest,” in particular, Latina/o communities
compliance with the VRA, as well as “traditional redistricting
principles.”245  CAPAFR also demonstrated crucial preparation
at each redistricting hearing, producing maps and analysis that
garnered praise from legislators and the Sacramento press corps,
among others.246  And CAPAFR presented a unified chorus of
many diverse APIA community voices around a single proposal.
CAPAFR’s advocacy led to the unification of many key com-
munities of interest in the 2001 Assembly lines.  The following
communities of interest were kept intact:
• AD 16 (Alameda):  North Oakland and its African Amer-
ican community were made whole and joined with
Oakland247
• AD 22 (Silicon Valley):  Cupertino, Sunnyvale, and
241 Id.
242 Id. ; see also  Hanh Kim Quach, Asians Draw the Line , O.C. REGISTER (Orange
County, Cal.), Sept. 9, 2001; Hanh Kim Quach, Redistricting Called Out of Bounds ,
O.C. REGISTER (Orange County, Cal.), Sept. 5, 2001; John Marelius, Redistricting
All Over the Map , THE SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, Sept. 8, 2001; Richard Winton,
Asian Americans Flex Growing Political Muscle , L.A. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2001, at B1.
243 Feng, supra  note 214, at 4.
244 Id.
245 CAPAFR REDISTRICTING EXECUTIVE REPORT, supra  note 148, at 1.
246 Ingram, supra  note 233; see also  Proposed and Adopted Maps in Appendix D.
247 See  Appendix D-1.
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\81-4\ORE402.txt unknown Seq: 51 30-SEP-03 13:46
Voting Matters:  APIAs, Latinas/os and Post-2000 Redistricting in California 899
Mountain View were unified and made whole248
• AD 45 (Los Angeles):  Philippine Town and Chinatown,
each split in two by the 1990 lines, were made whole249
• AD 49 (Los Angeles):  Monterey Park, Alhambra, El
Monte, Rosemead, San Gabriel, San Marino, and South
El Monte in the west San Gabriel Valley were unified in
one assembly district250
• AD 68 (Orange County):  Little Saigon and Koreatown,
each split in two by the 1990 lines, were made largely
whole251
• AD 75 (San Diego):  Mira Mesa, split in two by the 1990
lines, was made whole252
• AD 78 (San Diego):  Paradise Hills, the eastern portion of
Chula Vista, and Bonita were united in one district.253
The 2001 Assembly district plan also incorporated many of
their coalition-based proposals to build districts with a vision of
many different, multiracial communities with shared interests liv-
ing and working together.  Assembly District 16 (Oakland) and
Assembly District 49 (Los Angeles) are prime examples of such
communities.  Additionally, CAPAFR presence made a differ-
ence in the final lines drawn for several districts, including Dis-
tricts 9, 12, and 53.  APALC, the leading organization in the
CAPAFR coalition, played a vital role in bringing together
MALDEF Southwest Voters, NAACP-Legal Defense Fund, and
the African American Redistricting Committee to share re-
sources and ideas.254  This effort culminated in the first unified
Assembly proposal presented before the legislature on Septem-
ber 4, 2001.255
The complete summary of the proposed and adopted changes
to districts in CAPAFR regions, along with detailed maps show-
ing both the 1991 and 2001 lines, can be found in Appendix D.
Ultimately, CAPAFR was unable to unite Los Angeles’
Koreatown, which was frustratingly split into three Assembly dis-
tricts.  They also ran into political opposition by certain legisla-
248 See  Appendix D-2.
249 See  Appendix D-3.
250 See id.
251 See  Appendix D-4.
252 See  Appendix D-5.
253 See id.
254 See IMPACT OF REDISTRICTING, supra  note 21.
255 Id.
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tors who split San Jose’s Berryessa community into four districts,
including AD 20, 23, and 24.256
However, upon comparing CAPAFR’s performance in the re-
districting effort with some of the political losses endured by
some Latino communities257 and three incumbent Assem-
blywomen, CAPAFR efforts are worth noting.  Consider the
plight of three incumbent Democratic assemblywomen.  These
women, each preparing to run for the state senate, found that the
new lines diluted their former senate districts, leaving them with
no viable district in which they could run.258  Privately, these wo-
men Democrats admitted they made a big mistake by not being
more personally involved in the process and not having major
groups advocate for their interests.259  APIAs were not over-
looked in the post-2000 California redistricting process.
CAPAFR established itself as “a credible statewide network of
the APIA community to the state legislature during its most per-
sonal, critical and sensitive political process,”260  attaining a new
level of political recognition for the California APIA community.
In fact, during the last set of Assembly hearings held by the Sen-
ate and Assembly on Redistricting, Assemblyman John
Longville, the Chairman of the Assembly Committee on Elec-
tions, Reapportionment, and Constitutional Amendments, com-
plimented APIA community presentations and involvement:
[I] must commend you for the extraordinary job that
CAPAFR has done in providing assistance to us. . . . After
sitting through the eight hearings that I had in the time before
we began drawing maps as well as now the second day of these
hearings, there is no individual or organization that has come
forward with such an extraordinarily well done amount of re-
search and clear obvious efforts to reach out and work out
problems between different communities of interest and make
maps that work for everybody, and I want to commend you
for the extraordinary effort that you’ve put into this.  Recog-
nizing that lawyers will see different things, it’s obvious you’ve
done some extraordinary work.  We may not be able to obvi-
256 Tom, supra  note 17, at 4; Levey, supra  note 222; Noam Levey & Mike Zapler,
Berryessa Community Split Among Four Districts , SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Oct.
7, 2001, at A1; Hong Quoc Nguyen, Redistricting is Unfair to Valley’s Asian Ameri-
cans , SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Oct. 3, 2001.
257 See  Cano v. Davis, 211 F. Supp. 2d 1208 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
258 Aurelio Rojas, Redistricting Boundary Plan Criticized:  Minority and Women’s
Groups Say the New Lines Ignore Their Interests , THE SACRAMENTO BEE, Sept. 11,
2001, at A3.
259 Id.
260 Id.
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\81-4\ORE402.txt unknown Seq: 53 30-SEP-03 13:46
Voting Matters:  APIAs, Latinas/os and Post-2000 Redistricting in California 901
ously accommodate every single thing, but greatly appreciate
the work you’ve done.261
CAPAFR saw growth and success in their organization over
the past decade, holding their own in a process that all but shut
them out only ten years earlier.  As articulated by Maeley Tom,
“the legislative experience, political relationships and respect
CAPAFR has gained within the halls of the state capitol should
not go to waste.”262
However, more preparation will be needed for the post-2010
round of redistricting.  For one, CAPAFR must continue building
and strengthening its organizational and personal ties with
groups like MALDEF and NAACP-LDF in order to ensure a
broader coalitional approach to advocacy in the next redistricting
process.  A consistent and growing relationship with MALDEF
and NAACP-LDF, along with the sharing of information and
mapping tools, is absolutely essential in order to avoid grim sce-
narios where redistricting is cast as a zero-sum game.  The oppor-
tunity to speak with one voice, not merely as an APIA
community but also as a part of a broadly based cross-racial coa-
lition, was of tremendous benefit to all groups this time around
and will be vital to widening their sphere of influence in the As-
sembly.  CAPAFR should also take measures to ensure that its
political strategy and technological capability to crunch data and
produce electoral maps continues to be up to par.  Success in the
2001 Assembly plan warrants further expansion into the other
statewide redistricting processes, such as the redistricting process
for U.S. Congressional, California Senate, and local districts.
Most importantly, groups like CAPAFR, MALDEF and
NAACP-LDF are in a position to make legislators accountable
for their actions during this process by informing their respective
constituencies which legislators supported or opposed their
efforts.263
However, this cannot come about until the APIA community
and other communities of color, utilize their power to vote.  Spe-
cifically, APIAs can only flex their political muscle and enhance
the strength of CAPAFR by showing up in significant numbers at
the polls.264  CAPAFR’s constituent organizations should put ad-
261 CAPAFR REDISTRICTING EXECUTIVE REPORT, supra  note 148.
262 Tom, supra  note 17, at 5.
263 Id.
264 Id.
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ditional resources into voter registration efforts as well as  con-
tinuing the push for further compliance with Section 203 in all
covered jurisdictions.  Nonetheless, CAPAFR in 2002 is in a
prime position to capitalize on its newfound political presence as
a statewide coalition of APIA communities and further advance
the causes of the communities they serve.265
CONCLUSION
This piece began with the observation that, despite their grow-
ing population, in mainstream accounts of voting rights, Latinas/
os and APIAs do not appear in leading casebooks.266  Neverthe-
less, there has been much significant activism in states like Cali-
fornia, Texas, New York, Florida, and Illinois, which have
undergone rapid demographic transformation in the 1990s.267
The 2000 Census reflects the degree of this demographic trans-
formation in California.
Dramatic legal changes in voting rights law from a line of Su-
preme Court cases beginning with Shaw v. Reno , radically al-
tered the legal backdrop against which post-2000 redistricting
occurred.  In the post-2000 legal environment, race may not be
used as a predominant factor in redistricting, particularly if
“traditional redistricting principles” such as “compactness” or
“continuity” are ignored.  However, while race may not be a pre-
dominant factor, the Supreme Court has also refused to hold that
race is categorically forbidden as a factor in redistricting deci-
sions.  This leaves legislators and racial/ethnic civil rights groups
in a difficult and ambiguous position when considering or advo-
cating for electoral representation for communities of color.
This essay focused on the experience of Latinas/os and APIAs
as they pushed for electoral acknowledgement of their respective
communities through the decennial redistricting process.  In the
1980s and 1990s Latina/o groups like MALDEF pursued ground-
breaking voting rights litigation in Garza v. County of Los Ange-
les , demanding representation.268  In the 1990s, APIA groups
made steps towards electoral recognition via the redistricting
265 Id.
266 Ramirez, supra  note 10, at 957; William R. Tamayo, When the Colored are
Neither Black nor Citizens:  The United States Civil Rights Movement and Global
Migration , 2 ASIAN L.J. 1 (1995).
267 Geron & Lai, supra  note 115.
268 See  Garza v. County of Los Angeles, 918 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1990); Garza v.
County of Los Angeles, 756 F. Supp. 1298 (C.D. Cal. 1990).
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process, but were unable to completely surmount intragroup ten-
sions to successfully present a single voice when articulating a
redistricting agenda.  However, by the 2000 redistricting process
in California, APIAs were not only able to smooth out their in-
ternal splits but were also able to work in alliance with groups
such as MALDEF and NAACP-LDF to present redistricting pro-
posals for the Bay Area, Sacramento County, L.A. County and
San Diego County that were largely accepted by the California
legislature in the post-2000 round of redistricting.269
In conclusion, hopefully this essay will spark a discussion
within LatCrit scholarship about the importance of securing po-
litical power.  As the situation of both Latinas/os and APIAs in
California illustrates, the process of gaining political influence is
a long one, fraught with setbacks and disappointments, but not
without concomitant successful moments.  As the U.S. demo-
graphic mix becomes more complex, it underlines the necessity
of coalitions such as that undertaken by MALDEF, CAPAFR,
and NAACP-LDF to create a set of common and compatible re-
districting tools (such as mapping techniques and technologies
and population information) to avoid turning redistricting into a
zero-sum game where no one wins.270
However, it is not enough, and never will be enough, that for-
mer “outsiders” become “insiders” (whether African Americans,
Latinas/os or APIAs) if the same old political “machine” just
grinds on and on.  It is important how political power is secured
because that in turn has an effect on how political power is exer-
cised.  The authors would contend that CAPAFR’s efforts to
build an inclusive, democratic and participatory network to in-
form the redistricting proposals will ultimately result in people
being elected to these districts who will and must be more re-
sponsive to their full constituency.  It remains to be seen the de-
gree to which, if at all, elected Latina/o or APIA politicians in a
state like California, are willing to work for transformation of the
system or become entrenched defenders of “business as
269 See  Proposed and Adopted Maps in Appendix D.
270 See  John O. Calmore, Race-Conscious Voting Rights and the New Demography
in a Multicultural America , 79 N.C. L. REV. 1253 (2001); Leo F. Estrada, Making the
Voting Rights Act Relevant to the New Demographics of America:  A Response to
Farrell and Johnson , 79 N.C. L. REV. 1283 (2001); Walter C. Farrell, Jr. & James H.
Johnson, Jr., Minority Political Participation in the New Millenium:  The New
Demographics and the Voting Rights Act , 79 N.C. L. REV. 1215 (2001); YAMAMOTO,
supra  note 15.
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usual.”271
Lani Guinier and Gerald Torres write:
[V]oting is also a meaningless ritual when it is not tied to
power in any substantial way, when it simply signifies assent to
choices others have engineered or arranged.  Even assuming
voting’s efficacy as a means of civic engagement, it is rendered
empty by voters’ inability to have a voice in how their votes
are allocated, or by any assurance that their vote will make a
difference.  Hollow promises that “every vote counts,” incan-
tations of “count every vote,” and stories of extraordinary
elections decided by a handful of votes merely function as ex-
ceptions that prove the rule in the face of the overwhelming
and lopsided reelection rates of state and federal legislatures.
. . .
. . . .
A focus on individual candidates winning individual elec-
tions ignores the evidence that democratic collective action
usually begins on the ground.  It is most likely to be sustained
and meaningful when it is chosen by the people themselves
rather than imposed on them by others acting on their behalf.
. . . [T]he hard work of democracy is really found in mobilizing
the interactive and engaged participation of ordinary people at
the grassroots level.272
So, APIA and Latina/o politicians and organizers are at the
cusp of a very interesting moment in a state like California.  Will
they be able to engage with the dominant political “machine”
and transform it, or will they be transformed into mere cogs in
that “machine?”  Will they become tokens or pioneers? Tokens
enjoy their privileged, elite, elevated and often, entrenched sta-
tus, and may sometimes be accused of pulling the ladder they
used up after themselves to enhance their own power.  Pioneers
(in the finest, not the worst, sense of the word) may find them-
selves initially isolated in institutions such as the California As-
sembly but must work to transform the terms of admission and
entry so that many others may follow them.  “Transformers” or
“Cogs”?  Tokens or Pioneers?  It is perhaps too early to venture
a guess, but undoubtedly whatever the answer(s) may be, it will
be closely tied to the answer to the provocative question of
whether voting matters.
271 VICTOR M. VALLE & RODOLFO D. TORRES, LATINO METROPOLIS (2000);
Geron & Lai, supra  note 115.
272 LANI GUINIER & GERALD TORRES, THE MINER’S CANARY:  ENLISTING RACE,
RESISTING POWER, TRANSFORMING DEMOCRACY 207 (2002).
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APPENDIX A
CALIFORNIA 2000
Asian Pacific Islander Population by CAPAFR County,
Census 2000
API Pop. Percent API
County Population (DOJ) (DOJ)
Los Angeles 9,519,338 1,200,521 12.61%
Santa Clara 1,682,585 450,278 26.76%
Orange 2,846,289 415,030 14.58%
Alameda 1,443,741 318,543 22.06%
San Diego 2,813,833 284,875 10.12%
San Francisco 776,733 249,109 32.07%
Sacramento 1,223,499 150,706 12.32%
California Total 33,871,648 3,998,592 11.81%
Percent Increase in Asian Pacific Islander Population
by CAPAFR County, 1990-2000
Percent Increase in Numeric Increase in
County API Pop. (DOJ) API Pop. (DOJ)
Los Angeles 32.24% 292,711
Santa Clara 79.04% 198,782
Orange 72.39% 174,274
Alameda 72.36% 133,730
San Diego 53.87% 99,731
San Francisco 21.11% 43,423
Sacramento 63.58% 58,575
California Total 47.53% 1,288,239
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Asian Pacific Islander Population by CAPAFR County,
Census 1990
API Pop. Percent API
County Population (DOJ) (DOJ)
Los Angeles 8,863,164 907,810 10.24%
Santa Clara 1,497,577 251,496 16.79%
Orange 2,410,556 240,756 9.99%
San Francisco 723,959 205,686 28.41%
San Diego 2,498,016 185,144 7.41%
Alameda 1,279,182 184,813 14.45%
Sacramento 1,041,219 92,131 8.85%
California Total 29,760,021 2,710,353 9.11%
Source : U.S. Census Bureau, Compiled by the Asian Pacific American Legal
Center, (213) 977-7500.
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APPENDIX B
SAN GABRIEL VALLEY, CALIFORNIA
Asian Pacific Islander Population—San Gabriel Valley,
Census 2000
API Pop. Percent API
City Population (DOJ) (DOJ)
Alhambra 85,804 40,831 47.59%
Monterey Park 60,051 37,370 62.23%
Rosemead 53,505 26,178 48.93%
San Gabriel 39,804 19,703 49.50%
SGV Total 239,164 124,082 51.88%
Percent Increase in Asian Pacific Islander Population—
San Gabriel Valley, 1990-2000
Percent Increase in Numeric Increase in
City API Pop. (DOJ) API Pop. (DOJ)
Alhambra 30.40% 9,518
Monterey Park 7.08% 2,472
Rosemead 47.69% 8,453
San Gabriel 65.59% 7,659
SGV Total 29.28% 28,102
Asian Pacific Islander Population – San Gabriel Valley,
Census 1990
API Pop. Percent API
City Population (DOJ) (DOJ)
Alhambra 82,106 31,313 38.14%
Monterey Park 60,738 34,898 57.46%
Rosemead 51,638 17,725 34.33%
San Gabriel 37,120 12,044 32.45%
SGV Total 231,602 95,980 41.44%
Source : U.S. Census Bureau, compiled by the Asian Pacific American Legal
Center, (213) 977-7500.
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APPENDIX C
SOUTH BAY, CALIFORNIA
Asian Pacific Islander Population—South Bay, Census 2000
API Pop. Percent API
City Population (DOJ) (DOJ)
Long Beach 461,522 63,301 13.72%
Torrance 137,946 41,915 30.39%
Carson 89,730 22,987 25.62%
Gardena 57,746 16,265 28.17%
South Bay Total 746,994 144,468 19.34%
Percent Increase in Asian Pacific Islander Population –
South Bay, 1990-2000
Percent Increase in Numeric Increase in
City API Pop. (DOJ) API Pop. (DOJ)
Long Beach 14.61% 8,067
Torrance 44.05% 12,818
Carson 15.66% 3,112
Gardena (1.82)% (301)
South Bay Total 19.62% 23,696
Asian Pacific Islander Population – South Bay, Census 1990
API Pop. Percent API
City Population (DOJ) (DOJ)
Long Beach 429,433 55,234 12.86%
Torrance 133,107 29,097 21.86%
Carson 83,995 19,875 23.66%
Gardena 49,847 16,566 33.23%
South Bay Total 696,382 120,772 17.34%
Source : U.S. Census Bureau, compiled by the Asian Pacific American Legal
Center, (213) 977-7500.
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APPENDIX D
Appendix D consists of the attached seven maps detailing the
changes within the districts in CAPAFR regions.
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